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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the board neutrality and breakthrough rules found in 
Articles 9 and 11 respectively of the European Takeover Bids Directive, 2004 / 25 / EC. 
These Articles regulating takeover defences throughout the Member States constituted the 
most contentious part of the Directive and ultimately resulted in a political compromise - both 
rules were rendered optional by Article 12. There is a rich and ongoing debate on the 
regulation of takeovers into which these rules fall and this thesis shall attempt to put forth an 
argument which supports reform of Articles 9 and 11. This argument will be formed by 
adopting a multi-method approach, which marries historical context with economic theory, 
comparative analysis and empirical data. In doing so, it is hoped that this thesis will help 
contribute to the topic. 
 
It is structured as five chapters. The first of these looks at the history and the difficult path to 
adoption that the Directive took, framing the Directive within the political-economy 
landscape. The second chapter looks at the economic theory and empirical evidence on the 
wealth-effects of takeovers, to act as a foundation for arguments for reform based on 
economic efficiency which are presented later. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the board neutrality 
and breakthrough rules in detail. Their practical operation is discussed and the system of 
options they provide at the Member State and company levels is explained. These chapters 
also evaluate the success of these rules in line with the Commission's stated objectives and 
examine the implementation by the Member States. Finally the fifth chapter draws together 
the economic analysis and the analysis of the rules' application in order to suggest reforms 
which, in the author's opinion, would represent a positive advancement of EU takeover law.  
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Chapter 1 – History, Adoption and Transposition of the 
Directive 
 
1.1 History of the Directive 
The substantive problems of regulating takeovers are numerous and complex, creating a 
great body of academic work. The possible solutions are far from agreed upon, both in the 
academic community and in practice.1 The fact it took 30 years of legal and political process, 
characterised by setbacks, frustration and compromise, before a watered-down version of 
the Takeover Directive was formally adopted into European law in April 2004, is a testament 
to the difficulty faced by law-makers in this field. 
Where hostile takeovers are concerned, Professor Hopt rightly argues that globalisation 
does not respect traditional State boundaries or national law-making. Further, it 'jeopardises 
venerated national and legal traditions' which in combination with the ability to acquire 
corporate control via hostile means, can 'threaten even the largest enterprises, some of 
which, like Volkswagen, are national symbols;2 and even loosen the grip of national 
governments on key industries'.3 Thus, where national interests are at stake, one should be 
mindful that any takeover regulation must balance the divergent interests of the Member 
States on the one hand with the aim of achieving an integrated internal market on the other. 
Attempting to create a level playing field while satisfying Member States with diverse market 
economies, corporate governance structures, philosophies and cultures would almost 
inevitably leave some feeling victimised by having to apply a regime that seems more suited 
to another States' economy than their own. The Directive sought to achieve this balance 
through compromise, the result of which was the highly controversial Article 12 of the 
Directive. This Article, among other things, gave Member States the right to choose not to 
apply two of the key provisions of the directive, namely the board neutrality rule (BNR) in 
Article 9 and the breakthrough rule (BTR) in Article 11, which this thesis will consider in 
chapters 3 and 4 respectively.  
Nevertheless, it was this difficulty in finding a balance between national interests and 
achieving an integrated market which has been responsible for the difficulties over the 
                                                            
1 K. Hopt, 'Takeover regulation in Europe ‐ The Battle for the 13th directive on takeovers' (2002) 15 Aust JCL 1, 
p3.  
2 See the Volkswagen Act 1960, later amended in 2008.  Lower Saxony holds a 20% stake and the law requires 
important decisions require and 80% majority, allowing the State to block any decision which needs 
shareholder approval.  
3 Ibid 1 at p3.  
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years.4 The events that led up to the adoption of the Takeover Directive will now be 
considered. 
The Initial Proposal 
The first attempts to create a takeover regime in Europe were started over 30 years ago, 
when the Commission asked Professor Pennington to write a report on takeovers in Europe. 
He presented his report to the Commission in November 1974,5 which also included a draft 
directive, largely modelled on the UK Takeover Code. Years passed without progress 
however and the Pennington recommendations were abandoned, with the Member States 
showing a considerable lack of interest.6  
For a decade there was a period of relatively little interest in a European takeover regime.7 
Then in 1985, in its White Paper on completing the internal market, the Commission 
announced its intention to propose a directive on the approximation of Member States' law 
on takeover bids.8 The first draft of the proposal was completed in 1987, however it came 
under widespread criticism and for a brief period it looked as if the Commission's plans 
would come to nothing. 
But takeover regulation is a politically and economically sensitive area, and events were 
unfolding in Europe which would rapidly rekindle the Member States' interest, altering their 
political receptiveness to reform almost overnight.9 In January 1988, Italian financier Carlo 
de Benedetti extended a bid to acquire the controlling share of Société Générale de 
Belgique, initiating one of Europe's most controversial takeover battles of the decade. The 
corporate giant controlled over 1,300 companies worldwide and was estimated to have 
assets valued at approximately one-third of Belgium's total economy.10  
Though ultimately unsuccessful, Benedetti's bid created tremors which galvanised the 
European Parliament's interest in a takeover bids directive. As a result the Commission 
published a completed proposal for the directive on 19th January 1988.11 Takeover 
                                                            
4 Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework: A British Perspective, (Routledge 2009) at 
p9. 
5 European Commission, 'Report on Takeover Offers and Other Offers', Document XI/56/74. 
6 Ibid 4 at p9. 
7 However the Commission did issue guidelines in 1977 based on the Pennington recommendations. See 
European Commission, 'Recommendation of the European Community Commission of 25 July 1977 concerning 
a European Code of Conduct relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities' OJEC No. L212/37 of 20 August 
1997. 
8 High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 
2002 at p13. 
9 Rolf Skog, 'The takeover directive ‐ an endless saga?' European Business Law review, 13 (2002) 304. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid 1 at p9. 
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regulation was now on firmly on the agenda. After then receiving the opinions of the 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament, the Commission presented 
an amended proposal in September 1990. 
 The second attempt drew concern from multiple angles. One aspect which concerned 
Germany in particular was the mandatory bid rule and the restriction of defences available to 
the board of the target company. One might have expected the proposal to have been met 
with approval from the UK, especially considering the proposal was actually the result of UK 
initiatives to break down the considerable barriers to hostile takeovers which existed in 
Germany, the Netherlands and other continental European countries.12 These barriers sat in 
contrast to the UK market, which was relatively open to changes in corporate control. 
German companies such as Siemens for example, were in a position to successfully bid for 
UK companies,13 while UK companies would have no similar chance of acquiring German 
companies via a hostile bid.14 
Yet still the UK was not satisfied with the proposed Directive. They sought to minimise 
litigation, preferring self-regulation via Code and Takeover Panel to the EU's tendency to 
regulate legally. The concern was that a lack of provisions preventing tactical litigation, 
would cause an excessive amount of frivolous litigation for the supervisory body.15 
Based on this opposition, in its declaration to the European Council in Edinburgh in 1992, 
the commission announced it would revise its proposal based on the grounds of subsidiarity. 
Recognising it needed to respond to the concerns of the Member States, the Commission 
launched a consultation with them, aimed at identifying the issues which could be included in 
a revised proposal for a Takeover Bids Directive.16 
 
The Revised Proposal 
Following the consultation with the Member States, the Commission tried again in 1996, this 
time submitting the new proposal in a dramatically diluted form as a framework directive.17 In 
the consultation the Member States had shown a clear preference for a document that would 
only contain the general principles for a takeover bid, leaving considerable scope for the 
                                                            
12 Ibid 1 at p9. 
13 In 1988 Siemens launched a successful £1.7bn hostile takeover of Plessey plc. 
14 Though see the later section on Vodafone's acquisition of Mannesmann in 2000, the first successful takeover 
of its scale.  
15 Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework: A British Perspective, (Routledge 2009) 
p11 and ch2. Though some academics have questioned whether the original text posed a genuine threat.  
16 Ibid 8 at p13. 
17 Ibid 1 at p9. 
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Member States and the competent authorities to deal with the details of implementing those 
principles.18 For example, unlike the 1989 version, the 1996 proposal no longer contained a 
defined EU-wide threshold for the mandatory bid rule, instead leaving it up to the Member 
States to decide the percentage which would trigger a mandatory bid in their own 
jurisdiction.  
Both the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament endorsed this new 
proposal, though the latter did request minor amendments, resulting in the Commission 
presenting an amended proposal at the end of 1997. Following further debate, a 'Common 
Position' was eventually adopted by the Council on 19th June 2000.  
The Common Position 
Following the adoption of a common position by the Council, the proposal was submitted to 
Parliament for a second reading. Yet still there were concerns from Parliament. In particular, 
some Member States were not happy with the BNR. Here the divergent corporate 
governance structures between the Member States and even more so between Europe and 
the US showed the problems caused by the lack of a level playing field.  Enterprises in the 
US and in some of the Member States relied on pre-bid mechanisms and structures 
designed to shield them from hostile takeovers, while other States relied on action taken by 
the board post-bid in order to block a hostile takeover. These States were therefore 
concerned that the BNR would nullify their ability to prevent hostile takeovers, leaving them 
vulnerable to cross-border bids, while the barriers in other countries would remain largely 
intact.  
In all, Parliament wanted 20 amendments made to the proposal, the most significant of 
which was that the board of the target company be given extensive scope to be able to 
frustrate unwanted takeover bids. In January 2001, the Council responded to Parliament's 
amendments, clearly stating that Parliament's demands were unacceptable in their current 
form, thus beginning a period of 'conciliation' between the two parties. The process began in 
March 2001 and agreements were gradually made, point by point. Some points were met 
with relatively simple means, though in others both the Council and Parliament delegation 
made substantial concessions or dropped certain requirements.19  
There was one area however where the two parties were unwilling to find common ground - 
on the issue of the BNR. The Council's 'Common Position' which had been reached over a 
year ago stated that defensive measures taken by the board to frustrate a bid, could only be 
                                                            
18 Ibid 8 at p14. 
19 Ibid 9 at p309. 
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made with shareholder approval and only after the bid was announced. The Parliament 
delegation, led by German MEP Klaus-Heiner Lehne on the other hand, felt that the board 
should be able to take action prior to the announcement of a bid. The Council remained 
adamant that they were unwilling to compromise on this issue, an action which provoked the 
German business community into greatly intensifying their lobbying campaign, attempting to 
create a rift in the Council.20 
On 23 April, representatives from Volkswagen, BASF and other major German companies 
met with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, to issue their demands for changes to the 
proposed directive. Two days later, Germany informed the Council that they no longer 
backed the 'Common Position', and their support rested on the requirement for shareholder 
approval for frustrating actions to be removed, or that the BNR be removed entirely. The 
business community's lobbying campaign had been successful - now Germany stood 
isolated from the other Member States on the Council and were de facto siding with the 
Parliament.21 
Abandoning the 'Common Position' after over a year of arduous negotiations was seen as a 
totally unacceptable move by many, and that Germany had overstepped the rules. 
Nevertheless, the Council stuck to its original position on the issue. The Parliament 
delegation used this new conflict within the Council to push harder during the negotiations 
which continued throughout May and into June of 2001. Still no final agreement had been 
reached, and as part of the 'Conciliation' process, the deadline for an agreement was June 
6th. A final session took place on 5 June, with the help of Commission mediators. Eventually 
an agreement was reached. The Council had to concede a number of issues to the 
Parliament delegation, however the key argument over board neutrality was won by the 
Council, and it was agreed that the BNR would be a key provision of the Directive. The 
'Conciliation' process was therefore complete and the only thing left to do was for Parliament 
in plenary to vote on the matter. Since the Parliament delegation had reached an agreement, 
most expected this to be a mere formality.  
 
Vodafone and Mannesmann  
At this point, it would be worthwhile to consider events that were occurring in the European 
markets. As before with Benedetti's attempted takeover of Société Générale de Belgique in 
1988, now too would events on the securities market alter the perceptions of law-makers in 
                                                            
20 Ibid 9 at p309. 
21 Ibid 9 at p309.  
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the field of takeover law, though this time through an indirect route - corporate lobbyists. In 
2000, Vodafone successfully completed a €175bn acquisition of the German conglomerate 
Mannesmann AG after a 3 month takeover battle.22 Not only did this constitute the largest 
ever takeover at the time, but it was unprecedented in that Vodafone was the first foreign 
company to succeed in a hostile takeover of a large German company.23 
The stock market in Germany plays a very limited role - relatively few large corporations are 
listed and those which are, have highly concentrated ownership structures, held by large 
blockholders. The "Rhenish Capitalism"24 model of market economy found in Germany is 
characterised by extensive cross-shareholdings and a greater reliance on banks rather than 
stock markets. The cumulative effect being a lack of 'free-floating' shares for a bidder to 
acquire.25 Thus, Germany has long been considered a fortress against hostile takeovers. It is 
not surprising then, that hostile bids were seen by many in Germany as a foreign, highly 
undesirable element in German business.  
It was against this backdrop, of Germany's first successful hostile takeover, that several 
large German corporations became intensively involved in the European Parliament's 
response to the proposed Takeover Directive.26 They wanted to eliminate the risk that they 
too, like Mannesmann, could fall into foreign hands, by ensuring that the board of directors 
had recourse to defensive actions that could be used to frustrate unwanted bids. Thus, when 
the Conciliation process between the Council and Parliament arrived at an agreed joint text 
which included the BNR, alarm bells were set ringing and a final attempt at lobbying the 
MEPs before the final vote, was begun. The Parliamentary vote was set for 4 July, a month 
after the Council and Parliamentary delegation had come to an agreement. In the days 
leading up to the vote, it became apparent that the German business community had not 
given up the fight and, Rolf Skog, Sweden's representative, described the corridors of 
Parliament as a scene of "feverish activity."27 
The day of the vote produced a quite unexpected and unique result. 273 voted in favour of 
the Directive and 273 voted against, with 22 abstaining. The Directive needed a simple 
majority to pass, but had failed to achieve this by a single vote. Legally the Directive had 
                                                            
22 Financial Times, 21st December 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85db5080‐7220‐11da‐9ff7‐
0000779e2340.html#axzz2m2s1WHfZ  <accessed 29/11/13> 
23 Janet Morrison, The Global Business Environment: Meeting the Challenges (3rd Edn, Palgrave Macmillan) 
Ch11. 
24 Michal Albert  and Rauf Gonenc, 'The Future of Rhenish Capitalism' (1996) The Political Quarterly, 67, 184‐
193. 
25 Ibid 23, Ch11. 
26 Ibid 9 at p308. Recall also the meeting between representatives of VW, BASF and others with Chancellor 
Schröder, above.  
27 Ibid 9 at p310. 
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been rejected, ending the process. Nevertheless, the EU Commission was free to begin 
again, which is exactly what they did. 
 
A New Attempt and the High Level Group of Company law experts  
Though the Commission's disappointment at the result of the vote was evident,28 both the 
Council and Commission had stressed in different settings that they envisioned the Takeover 
Directive as a vital puzzle piece in the realisation of an internal market.29 Thus it is no 
surprise that, following the stalemate in the European Parliament in July 2001, the 
Commissioner for the internal market, Frits Bolkestein, immediately announced plans for a 
new draft of the Directive.  
The Commission's first action was to engage a 7-man group of company law experts (the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts) chaired by Professor Jaap Winter.30 The 
Group's role was to provide independent advice on the rules relating to pan-European 
takeovers and resolve the issues that had been raised by the European Parliament. The 
group published its first report in January 2002 and the recommendations it contained 
revolved around two guiding principles: shareholder decision making; and proportionality 
between risk bearing capital and control.31  
Of primary interest to this thesis are the BNR and BTR. Both can be derived from the 
abovementioned principles respectively and were recommended to be included in the 
Directive by the High Level Group, as detailed by 'Recommendations 1.2 and 1.4' of the 
Report.32 
 
 The first principle, inter alia, manifests itself as the BNR. Shareholders should be the 
ultimate decision makers when a takeover bid is received, not the board of the target 
company. Some opposition has been levelled at this principle33 but the High Level Group 
rejected this based on the 'insolvable conflict of interest'34 with which managers are faced in 
                                                            
28 European Commission, 'Commission regrets rejection of Takeovers Directive by the European Parliament' 
(Press release IP/01/943). In this press release, Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein commented, 
"Twelve years of work have been wasted by today's decision [the Parliamentary vote]… It is tragic to see how 
Europe's broader interests can be frustrated by certain narrow interests.' 
29 Ibid 9 at p310.  
30 European Commission, 'Commission creates High Level Group of Company Law Experts' (Press release 
IP/01/1237, Brussels, 4 September 2001). 
31 Ibid 8 at p20 et seq. 
32 Ibid 8 at p6. 
33 See Chapter 3 of this thesis which discusses the Board Neutrality Rule.   
34 Ibid 1 at p11. 
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a takeover situation - it would be naïve to expect managers to sacrifice their jobs and 
reputations in order to maximise the value of the company for shareholders.  
 
The BTR that the High Level Group advocated can be derived from the second guiding 
principle, of proportionality between risk bearing capital and control. The High Level Group's 
argument was as follows: 
 
The holders of such capital are entitled to participate in the profits of the 
company and the residual assets in event of liquidation. They are best placed 
to decide on the affairs of the company as they  are  the ultimate economic 
risk bearers of their own decisions and should therefore be granted control 
rights in proportion to the risk they bear. Thus, control structures with 
disproportionate voting rights should not frustrate a bid where a majority of the 
risk-bearing, but not voting-capital is acquired35. 
 
Therefore, they recommended a 'Breakthrough Rule' which was designed to allow an 
acquirer of a set percentage (75%) of the risk-bearing capital to 'break-through' mechanisms 
and structures designed to frustrate a bid, as defined in the articles of association and other 
related documents.  
 
1.2 The Final Draft Proposal and Adoption 
The recommendations put forth by the High Level Group were interpreted broadly by the 
Commission when they published the third draft Directive in October 2002.36 As expected, 
the basis of the new draft was the joint text that had been approved by the Council and the 
European Parliament delegation in June 2001, as part of the 'Conciliation process.' 
Accordingly, much of the draft remained untouched, though the High Level Group's 
recommendations influenced the inclusion of a 'squeeze-out' (Article 14) and 'Sell-out' 
(Article 15) rule, as well as a common definition of 'equitable price' (article 5).  
The real controversy remained however with the anti-takeover defences. The Commission, 
in accordance with the recommendation of the High Level Group, kept the BNR (Article 9) 
which had been the source of such troublesome negotiations before.  
                                                            
35 Ibid 8 at p3. 
36 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council on takeover bids (13th directive), Brussels, 2 October 2002, COM(2002) 534 final. 
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On the other hand, the Commission acknowledged that the BTR, as proposed by the High 
Level Group was "opposed by virtually all Member States and interested parties."37 
Nevertheless, they followed the logic behind the BTR and included Article 11, which 
stipulated that restrictions on transfers of securities and restrictions on voting rights would be 
unenforceable against the offeror, or cease to have effect once a bid had been made 
public.38 Thus, elements of the BTR were adopted, though as a matter of politics, only in 
part.39 
 
The Portuguese Compromise and the Formal Adoption of the Directive  
It took nearly two more years of intense bargaining, but eventually the Directive was formally 
adopted in April 2004. The controversy and disagreements surrounding the BNR and now 
additionally the BTR did not abate however. Indeed it took a major compromise before a final 
agreed text could be reached, and be approved by the European Parliament. The 2012 
Study by Marccus Partners, undertaken on behalf of the Commission, summarises this 
compromise as follows: 
"one of the most controversial proposed aspects of the Directive was whether 
to adopt the board neutrality rule (Article 9 of the Directive) and the 
breakthrough rule (Article 11 of the Directive). These provisions were 
controversial because they crystallise oppositions on the value of facilitating 
and frustrating takeovers. In order for the Directive to be enacted, the Member 
States eventually agreed to a compromise suggested by Portugal, in late 
2003. The compromise made was essentially to make Articles 9 and 11 of the 
Directive optional. That is, Member States could opt out of transposing the 
board neutrality or breakthrough rule, or both, but they could not prevent 
individual companies from voluntarily opting in to the rules. This compromise 
made Articles 9 and 11 of the Directive options for which there are two levels 
of possible adoption: at the national level, and then at the company level. 
Even if the breakthrough or board neutrality rule is adopted at the national or 
company level, the Portuguese compromise further introduced a third option: 
reciprocity. If a Member State allowed for reciprocity, even if one or both of the 
                                                            
37 Ibid at p4. 
38 Ibid at p4.  
39 Ibid 1 at p16.  
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opt-in rules is adopted, a company still has the option not to apply the rule 
when faced with an offeror who has not adopted the same rule"40 
Despite the success of finally being adopted, it was not the Directive that the Commission 
had originally envisioned. The optional nature of Article 12 meant that it constituted a 'flexible 
framework'41 Directive rather than a regulatory instrument with specific rules. The primary 
reason for the Directive in the eyes of the Commission was to promote the integration of the 
national economies in the European 'Single Market' and to facilitate takeover bids, thereby 
enhancing the competitiveness of the European market,42 in accordance with their 2002 
proposal.43 One way they aimed to achieve this was the much touted 'creation of a level 
playing field' between the Member States, yet by making two of the key provisions of the 
Directive optional, the door was left wide open for the Member States to transpose the 
Directive in a protectionist manner that served individual national interests rather than 
harmonising takeover defences. Therefore, as pointed out by Davies et al, the transposition 
decisions of the Member States regarding this Directive were far more significant than 
usual.44  
The next section will look at how the Member States implemented the Directive in the 
national legal systems. The key focus of this will be on which States chose to implement the 
Board Neutrality and Breakthrough rules and which chose to opt-out under Article 12 of the 
Directive. As will be shown, by allowing the Member States to opt-out of key provisions at 
the national level, the Directive failed in its objective of harmonising takeover law, allowing 
the varied corporate cultures to remain largely intact throughout Europe.45  
 
The compromise making the provisions optional was, unsurprisingly , bitterly opposed by 
Commissioner Bolkestein, who remarked that it made the Directive "not worth the paper it's 
written on."46  
                                                            
40 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report,  
41 Wouters et Al. (2009) ‘The European Takeover Directive: a commentary’, in Hooghten P.V. (Ed.): The 
European Takeover Directive and Its Implementation, pp.3–76, Oxford University Press, New York. 
42 Davies, Paul L. and Schuster, Edmund‐Philipp and van de Walle de Ghelcke, Emilie, The Takeover Directive as 
a Protectionist Tool? (February 17, 2010). ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 141/2010 at pp2‐3. 
43 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Takeover Bids, COM (2002) 534 final, Brussels, October 2002 p3. 
44 Ibid 42 at p3. 
45 Ibid 4 at p11.  
46 Financial Times, 18th October 2004, p6.  
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1.3 The Status of Transposition  
Transposition is now complete in all sample States. It should be stated that Croatia recently 
acceded to the European Union as the 28th Member State in July 2013 and will not be 
considered in this thesis. Many sample countries implemented the Directive gradually 
through several pieces of legislation rather than in one go. As such, 12 sample countries had 
failed to implement the Directive by the transposition deadline. The following table shows the 
year in which the respective Member State fully or substantially transposed the Directive: 
Year Countries 
2005 Poland, Romania. 
2006 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, UK. 
2007 Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, Netherlands, 
Slovakia, Spain. 
2008 Czech Republic, Estonia. 
 
 
Transposition of the Board Neutrality and Breakthrough Rules 
The compromise discussed above which was necessary to adopt the Directive rendered the 
BNR and BTR optional, giving Member States the discretion whether or not to apply them. 
However, Article 12 further stipulated that if a Member State decides not to make these rules 
mandatory, it cannot prevent an individual company from applying either or both of the rules 
on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, the 'Reciprocity' exception (Article 12(3)) allows Member 
States to authorise companies applying the BNR and BTR to cease applying them when 
faced with a bid from an offeror that is not himself subject to these rules in his country. 
Such a complex system of options can hardly be seen as a successful method of 
harmonising takeover regulation throughout Europe. Since the theme of this chapter has 
been to look at how politically and economically sensitive the landscape of takeover 
regulation is, the following table highlights the nature of this issue. It shows which countries 
implemented the BNR and BTR, but the key information to take away is whether 
implementation of the Directive brought about a change in the takeover regime of the 
particular Member State with regards to the BNR and BTR, or whether the State remained 
with its status quo. Many Member States had a BNR in place, prior to implementing the 
Directive. Therefore, despite adopting the Rule, their regime retained the status quo.  
13 
 
Country Board Neutrality Rule Breakthrough Rule 
Austria Yes - not new No - not new 
Belgium No - not new No - not new 
Bulgaria No - not new No - not new 
Cyprus Yes - new No - not new 
Czech Republic Yes - not new No - not new 
Denmark No - not new No - not new 
Estonia Yes - not new Yes - new 
Finland Yes - new No - not new 
France Yes - not new No - not new 
Germany No - not new No - not new 
Greece Yes - not new No - not new 
Hungary No - not new No - not new 
Ireland Yes - not new No - not new 
Italy Yes- not new No - not new 
Latvia Yes - new Yes - new 
Lithuania Yes - not new Yes - new 
Luxembourg No - not new No - not new 
Malta Yes - new No - not new 
Netherlands No  - not new No - not new 
Poland No - not new No - not new 
Portugal Yes - not new No - not new 
Romania Yes - new No - not new 
Slovakia Yes - not new No - not new 
Slovenia Yes - not new No - not new 
Spain Yes - not new No - not new 
Sweden Yes - not new No - not new 
UK Yes - not new No - not new 
Source: Takeover Bids assessment report47 and Davies et al, see nr 42 above. 
This table shows that 19 out of 27 Member States (Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK) impose the BNR. While 19 out of 27 States 
may seem like a success for the Directive, it is important to consider that only 5 Member 
States introduced the BNR as a result of the Directive. In addition, the States in which the 
                                                            
47 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm. 
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Directive brought about change tend to have very small capital markets relative to the rest of 
Europe. Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Malta and Romania account for only 2% of the total of EU 
capital markets.48 In economic terms therefore the BNR under the Directive has had a 
minimal impact.  
 
Moreover, the only countries to fully transpose the BTR are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Again, these Member States represent on a tiny fraction of the EU capital markets total. The 
reasons for this will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The key point to take away from 
this, is the clear opposition the majority of Member States have towards the rule. Such 
widespread rejection of the rule highlights the clear problems the Member States have with it 
and once again show the optionality compromise of the Directive was necessary in order for 
its adoption. The Member States of the European Union were not ready for a full regulatory 
takeover regime - a framework was the limit they were willing to agree to.  Thus, a flexible 
options-based regime was the result of political compromise. The question this thesis seeks 
to answer is whether this represents the optimal takeover regime for Europe. If this answer is 
negative, then the question becomes how the BNR and BTR could be reformed in order to 
further the positive advancement of EU takeover law. To do this, the next chapter shall look 
at the underlying economic evidence and theory behind takeovers. 
                                                            
48 Ibid 42. See also chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 – The Economic Theory of Takeover Regulation 
 
Chapter Introduction 
Any given takeover can either be wealth-creating or wealth-destructive. An efficient (i.e. 
wealth-creating) outcome hinges on a variety of factors and in spite of careful forecasts and 
projections based on probabilistic information, it is only revealed ex post whether the 
takeover was efficient or not.1 
The economic analysis in this chapter will conclude that both hostile and friendly takeovers 
average out to be efficient and thus create wealth.2 However there is no way of knowing ex 
ante whether any individual takeover will be efficient or not. The real-world result of this is 
that in certain instances wealth-destructive takeovers can be approved while other wealth-
creating takeovers do not go ahead. 
A regulatory framework which facilitates takeovers (a pro-takeover regime) would see 
wealth-creating takeovers become more common, but so too would wealth-destructive 
takeovers. On the other hand a takeover restrictive regime would prevent more inefficient 
takeovers, but also block wealth-creating ones. The debate surrounding hostile takeover 
regulation therefore boils down to whether hostile takeover attempts should be facilitated or 
impeded.3 Of course, such a question does not adequately reflect the richness of the debate 
or the nuanced viewpoints of the many commentators, however the level of contestability of 
corporate control is undoubtedly the central issue of takeover regulation.  
The chapter will look at the economic evidence on the wealth-effects of hostile takeovers 
(and for comparison, friendly takeovers). The BNR and BTR are both means to facilitate 
takeovers and thus form a basis for a pro-takeover regime. Allowing Board defences on the 
other hand is a staple of a takeover restrictive regime. This chapter will therefore consider 
the economic evidence behind each regime, before briefly considering how the evidence 
would support an 'unbiased' approach. 
 
                                                            
1 Luca Enriques,  Ronald Gilson, Alessio Pacces  The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to 
the European Union) (May 1, 2013) at p2. ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 212; Columbia Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 450; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 444. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926. 
2 See section 'Conclusions on the benefits of hostile takeovers', below. 
3 Ibid 1 at p2. 
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2.1 The meaning of wealth in the takeover context 
Firstly it would be useful to set a definition of wealth-creating and wealth-destructive 
takeovers. Which category a given takeover will fall into can be qualified by calculating 
whether the winners' gains exceed the losers' losses, net of transaction costs.4 This is the 
'Kaldor-Hicks efficiency' and states that an outcome is efficient if those who benefit could in 
theory compensate those who are worse off, and still be in a better position.5  
For the purpose of this thesis only the wealth effects of shareholders will be considered - the 
wealth effects on stakeholders (employees, local communities, customers) will be ignored. 
This is not to say that the wealth effects on these groups are unimportant, but rather such 
effects are extremely difficult to quantify in comparison to the effects on shareholders, which 
can easily and accurately be quantified by the currency values applied to share prices. This 
yields an efficient evaluation criterion and is the norm in financial theory.6  
Further, as Enriques et al point out, takeovers are only one way a corporation responds to 
changing economic conditions. Competition can force corporations to make workers 
redundant, lower wages, and close plants. Thus takeovers are just one of a range of 
mechanisms through which competition operates and equilibration occurs.7 Since takeover 
regulation is neither the only nor the best means of safeguarding the interests of these 
stakeholders, the wealth effects on these groups are not considered in the discussion on 
takeover regulation.8 
Therefore when the terms 'wealth-creating' and 'wealth-destructive' are used, this refers 
specifically to shareholder wealth. 
 
2.2 Hostile takeovers: pro, restrictive and neutral regimes 
There are 3 distinct schools of thought of how to approach takeover regulation which can be 
categorised as the following; those who advocate a pro-takeover regime, those who favour 
restrictive regime, and those who take a neutral (or unbiased) stance. This following section 
will evaluate the literature and empirical evidence for each position, before concluding. 
                                                            
4 Ibid 1 at p7. 
5 John R Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON J 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, ECON J 549 (1939).  
6 M Martynova & L Renneboog, ‘A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and 
Where Do We Stand?’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 2148 at p2156. 
7 Ibid 1 at p7. 
8 The High Level Group of Company Experts were of the opinion that such stakeholders should be protected by 
specific rules e.g on labour law and environmental law. High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on 
Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 2002 at p22. 
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2.3 Analysis of a pro-takeover regime 
According to pro-takeover commentators, takeovers are overall beneficial for corporate 
governance.  They argue that a mechanism which facilitates takeover bids, effects two main 
economic benefits. The High Level Group of Company Law Experts identified these as: 9 
a) a mechanism for disciplining poorly performing management, 
b) exploitation of synergies between bidder and target to create wealth. 
This section will consider the economic benefits of takeovers and thus whether the support 
for a pro-takeover regime is justified.  
Disciplining Management 
Hostile takeovers were first recognised as a means of disciplining management in the 1950s. 
According to Rostow, “the raider persuades the stockholders for once to act as if they really 
were stockholders, in the black-letter sense of the term, each with the voice of partial 
ownership and a partial owner’s responsibility for the election of directors.”10 Put differently, 
in companies with dispersed ownership structures, underperforming management may not 
face activism from shareholders due to rational apathy and collective action problems.11 
Managerial underperformance equates to an inefficient use of the company's resources, and 
though theoretically empowered, the shareholders are unable to replace the management. In 
this scenario, a hostile bid forces the dispersed shareholders into action and allows for the 
reallocation of resources to a more efficient user (the bidder).12  
Where management is underperforming, market theory dictates that this will be reflected in a 
drop in the share price, attracting third party management who will offer a premium on the 
shares via a hostile tender. This suggests that the management team of the acquiring firm, 
having an excess of managerial competence, can efficiently manage the larger amount of 
resources that the firm being acquired possesses, in which the target management was 
unable, for the opposite reasons of inefficiency, to manage the assets it controlled.13 The 
new management will hope to utilise the resources more efficiently and therefore be met with 
a corresponding rise in share price, allowing them to recoup the initial premium. 
                                                            
9 Ibid at p19.  
10 E. Rostow, . “To whom and for what ends are corporate managements responsible?” In: Mason, E.S. 
(Ed.), The Corporation in Modern Society. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. (1959) p47. 
11 P. Davies, Edmund‐Philipp Schuster, & Emilie van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a 
Protectionist Tool? in Company law and economic protectionism: New challenges to European Integration (Ulf 
Bernitz & Wolf‐Georg Ringe eds. 2010). p13. 
12 R Gilson, “A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers” 
(1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 819, 841. 
13 G. Tsagas, EU Takeover Regulation: One Size Can't Fit All (November 1, 2010). International Journal of Private 
Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.171–184, January 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922295 p178. 
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In theory this is a desirable control shift, as it reallocates resources to a more efficient user, 
generates wealth for the target shareholders (who receive the premium) and creates a more 
efficient company.  
The disciplinary effect is not limited to actual (observable) control transfers. A pro-takeover 
regime would exert pressure on incumbent management to operate their companies 
efficiently, or otherwise be replaced.14 Here, the disciplining effect aligns shareholders' and 
managers' interests, reducing agency costs by dealing with the principal-agent problems 
between shareholders and management.15 From a policy perspective, this is a logical effect 
to employ, the end result being resources shifted into the hands of those best able to 
manage them, thus producing more efficient control structures.16 
Questions have been raised however about the validity of the disciplining effect of takeovers. 
Firstly, commentators make the point that the disciplining effect is only relevant to 
companies with a dispersed shareholder ownership which face collective action problems. 
This is not the case in companies where there is a controlling blockholder,17 who does have 
sufficient incentive to monitor the management and replace them if necessary.18 As figures 1 
and 2 below show, the majority of companies in continental Europe are controlled by 
blockholders. Some commentators therefore argue the disciplining effect serves little 
purpose there, and is only relevant in the UK. 
                                                            
14 A. White, Reassessing the Rationales for the Takeover Bids Directive's Board Neutrality Rule (October 1, 
2012). European Business Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 23, 2012. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205109. p792. 
15 See R. Romano,  ‘A guide to takeovers: theory, evidence and regulation’, Yale Journal on 
Regulation,  (1992) Vol. 9, pp.119–179; and A. Dignam, ‘The globalisation of general principle 7: transforming 
the market for corporate control in Australia and Europe’, Legal Studies, (2008) Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.96–118. 
16 Ibid 11. 
17 The term 'blockholder' is used to refer to a shareholder of the company, who under normal circumstances, 
can exercise effective control over the company due to his shareholding. 
18 Ibid 11 at p14.  
19 
 
 
(Source - McCahery and Renneboog 2003) 
 
 
(Source - McCahery and Renneboog 2003) 
 
20 
 
One of the proponents of this line of reasoning states that, "the overall picture suggests, 
therefore, a market for corporate control that has lacked, and may likely continue to lack, 
much disciplinary effect in much of continental Europe."19 However, this conclusion is 
disputed - while it is recognised that the blockholding share ownerships that are the norm in 
continental Europe often do nullify the disciplinary effect of a takeover, to say the disciplinary 
effect has no relevance there at all is incorrect.  
Firstly, the issue is which type of ownership structure a company has, dispersed or 
blockholder, rather than which category is the majority in a given jurisdiction. Though 
unusual, companies with dispersed ownership can be found in jurisdictions where 
blockholder control is typical and the disciplinary effect of takeovers will therefore have some 
relevance.20 
Secondly, empirical evidence points to a discernible trend towards an increase in companies 
not under blockholder control in continental Europe, and a move towards more dispersed 
ownership. Franks et al21 used a (relatively generous) test of no shareholder having more 
than 25% as a criterion of a company having dispersed ownership. Their study considered 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK, between 1996-2006. The UK remained steady at >90% 
while in all three continental jurisdictions, the percentage of dispersed companies 
increased:22 
  Percentage of companies 
with dispersed ownership 
(1996)
Percentage of companies 
with dispersed ownership 
(2006)
France  21% 37%
Germany  26% 48%
Italy  3%  22%
 
These figures suggest that the pressures of globalisation and the expansion of the single 
market within the European Community are generating greater dispersed ownership within 
continental markets23. A continuation of this trend will therefore correlate positively with a 
greater relevancy of the disciplining effect of takeovers in continental Europe as dispersed 
ownership continues to become more prevalent. 
It seems therefore that the argument that the disciplinary effect of takeovers has no 
relevance in continental European markets is debateable. But even if this is the case, 
                                                            
19 Ibid 14 at p793.  
20 Ibid 11 at p14. 
21 J Franks, C Mayer, P Volpin and H Wagner, ‘Evolution of Family Capitalism: A Comparative Study of France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK’ EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102475. 
22 Ibid, Table 2, Panel B. 
23 Ibid 11, at p17. 
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empirical evidence shows that the relevance of the disciplinary effect may be questioned 
from another angle. As was discussed above, and is a common argument in the literature,24 
companies with underperforming management should become targets for a hostile bid, in 
which the company resources can be managed more efficiently by a different management, 
thus allowing a desirable control shift.  
However, the empirical evidence shows that this is not the case. The prediction that hostile 
takeovers should primarily target underperforming companies is not borne out by the 
evidence.25 In a study of US companies undertaken in 2000, Schwert identified variables that 
could indicate poor performance of a company such as low market-to-book ratios and return 
on assets and concluded that these contributed little to nothing to whether a firm would be 
the target of a hostile bid.26 The available evidence for the UK also fails to show that targets 
of hostile bids had poorer pre-bid performance than other targets. Franks and Meyer 
(1996)27 looked at pre-bid share price, cash flow, dividend payout and Tobin's Q28 as 
indicators of poor performance, but similarly concluded that the evidence failed to show that 
the targets of hostile bids had poorer pre-bid performance than other targets. 
Conclusions on the Disciplining Effect of Hostile Takeovers 
A widely accepted29 motive for hostile takeovers is the displacement of inefficient 
management, thus making them a beneficial external corporate governance mechanism by 
disciplining inefficient management. As Brealey and Myers contend, "there are always firms 
with unexploited opportunities to cut costs and increase sales and earnings. Such firms are 
natural candidates for acquisition by other firms with better management"30 Yet despite its 
general acceptance by financial economists and legal commentators, there is very little 
empirical evidence to support this hypothesis31 - studies show that hostile bids are not aimed 
at underperforming companies. Nevertheless, this data only applies to actual bids, the 
disciplining effect may still play an ex ante role on incumbent managers, as the threat of 
                                                            
24 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, p274. 
25 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Law and Governance, in Handbook of law and 
Economics, p879 (A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
26 G. Schwert, . “Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder?” Journal of Finance (2000) 55, 2599– 
2640 
27J. Franks, Mayer, C.  “Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure”. Journal of Financial 
Economics (1996) 40, 163–181 
28 The 'Q ratio' is calculated by dividing the company's market capitalisation by the total replacement value of 
its assets. A value between 0‐1 indicates the company is undervalued, while a value >1 indicates it is 
overvalued. 
29 See e.g the High Level Group of Company law Experts report, above n8, which identified the disciplining 
effect of takeovers as one of the reasons why they are "basically beneficial". 
30 R. Brealey, . Myers, C. Principles of Corporate Finance, 2000, p945 (Mcgraw Hill, New York)  
31 Kini, O., Kracaw, W. and Mian, S, The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 
(2004) 59, at p1549. 
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replacement if perceived to be underperforming provides an incentive to operate the 
company efficiently.32 
Overall however it would seem that the beneficial disciplining effect of hostile takeovers is 
overstated, leading to much of the academic literature attaching too much weight to the 
benefits of the effect. This is an important consideration to be taken into account when 
crafting takeover regulation.  
 
Exploiting synergies to create wealth  
In addition to the disciplining effect, the other classically stated benefit of hostile takeovers 
(equally applicable to friendly) is the creation of wealth by exploiting synergies. Here, 
contestability of corporate control serves a more general efficiency purpose.33 The target's 
assets in this scenario are of unique value to the acquirer.34 Combining the assets of these 
firms creates value through synergies, which cannot be achieved by even the most talented 
and diligent managers of the target.35 
These synergies can be classed as either operating or informational. Operating synergies 
arise from combining assets which allow for economies of scale36 or scope.37 Informational 
synergies are generated when the value of the combined assets of the companies is greater 
than the value the stock markets attribute to them individually.38 For example, this often 
constitutes a slack-rich company with poor growth opportunities acquiring a slack-poor 
company with excellent growth opportunities, resulting in the combined firm having the 
necessary capital to realise the potential for growth. The exploitation of synergies in this way 
to create wealth is the main driver behind mergers and acquisitions in addition to being a 
motive for hostile bids.  
                                                            
32 Ibid 13 p178. 
33 Ibid 11 at p13. 
34 R Romano, ‘A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation’ (1992) 9 Yale Journal of Regulation 
119, 125‐129. 
35 Ibid 11 at p 13. 
36 An economy of scale are factors which reduce the average cost of production as the volume of production 
increases. I.e production on a larger scale is cheaper.  
37 An economy of scope consists of factors that make it cheaper to produce a range of products together than 
to produce each one of them on its own. Such economies can come from businesses sharing centralised 
functions, such as accounting or marketing. 
38 J. McCahery, L. Renneboog, and Ritter, Peer and Haller, Sascha. (2003) The Economics of the Proposed 
European Takeover Directive. CEPS Reports in Finance and Banking No. 32, 1 April 2003 at p18. 
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Unsurprisingly, the wealth creation benefit of hostile takeovers has received extensive 
amounts of academic attention and numerous empirical studies have been undertaken.39 As 
with this thesis, these have focused largely on shareholder wealth40 (as opposed to other 
stakeholders). Traditionally, the focus has been on changes in short-term shareholder 
wealth, but long-term wealth and combined firm operating performance have received 
significant attention.  
Wealth creating synergies of hostile takeovers were identified as one of the attributes of 
hostile takeovers which make them "basically beneficial"41 according to the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts and one of the reasons for facilitating takeovers. But it is 
questionable whether this reasoning is supported by the empirical evidence. This section will 
consider both the short and long-term wealth-effects of hostile takeovers. 
Short term wealth effects of hostile takeovers 
Analysing short term shareholder wealth effects hinges on the premise that a hostile bid 
announcement brings new information to the market, such that investors expectations about 
the firm's prospects are altered, resulting in a corresponding change in share price.42  
When it comes to target shareholders the studies unanimously find that they receive 
substantial positive returns. Both friendly and hostile bids result in positive returns for target 
shareholders, but this is significantly higher with a hostile bid. In a study of US companies it 
was found that the 'cumulative average abnormal returns'43 (CAARs) for a friendly bid were 
22% and 32% for hostile bid.44 Similarly, in a study of UK companies it was found that 
friendly bids triggered CAARs of 18% and nearly 30% for hostile bids.45 
On the other hand, when it comes to the shareholders of acquiring firms, the difference is 
striking. Martynova and Renneboog surveyed 65 studies and found that the average CAARs 
for bidder shareholders for all types of takeover (both hostile and friendly) was 
indistinguishable from zero.46 However while the returns for friendly takeovers tended to be 
                                                            
39 See Martynova and Renneboog, n6 above and Becht, n25 above, for an excellent overview of the studies.  
40 Because, inter alia, shareholders are the residual owners of the company and thus bear the ultimate risk.  
41 Ibid 8 at p22. 
42 bid 6 at p8. 
43 H .Servaes, 1991, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers, Journal of Finance 46 (1), 409‐419. 
44 Ibid. The event window for this study was day 0 (announcement day) ‐ close (day target delisted). 
45J.  Franks, and C. Mayer, 1996, Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure, Journal of Financial 
Economics 40, 163‐181. The event window for this study was day 0 ‐ day 20. 
46 Ibid 6 at p11. 
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insignificantly positive, shareholder returns for firms making hostile bids tended to be 
negative.47 
McCahery and Renneboog in a 2003 study looked at European takeovers between 1993-
2000 with a deal value of greater than $100 million. Tables 3 and 4 below show the CAARs 
over various event windows of target and bidding firms.  
 
Table 3 - Cumulative average abnormal returns of target shareholders 
Time Interval Merger Friendly 
Acquisition
Hostile 
Acquisition 
Multiple 
Bidders
Event Window 
(days) 
% % % %
[-1, 0] 8.80 5.96 12.60 6.89
[-2, +2] 12.62 11.33 17.95 11.28
[-40, 0] 23.41 20.34 29.23 23.68
[-60, +60] 23.59 26.52 28.36 20.53
Observations 40 53 28 14
(Source - McCahery and Renneboog 2003) 
 
Table 4 - Cumulative average abnormal returns of bidder shareholders 
Time Interval Merger Friendly 
Acquisition
Hostile 
Acquisition 
Multiple 
Bidders
Event Window 
(days) 
% % % %
[-1, 0] 2.20 2.43 -2.51 -0.08
[-2, +2] 4.35 1.94 -3.43 0.85
[-40, 0] 4.63 4.68 -2.51 -1.04
[-60, +60] 3.03 -1.67 -0.69 -2.96
Observations 41 55 32 17
(Source - McCahery and Renneboog 2003) 
These tables show similar findings to the survey undertaken by Martynova - shareholders of 
target firms receive substantial premiums over the market price, and this effect is amplified 
where the bid is hostile. On the other hand, shareholders of bidding firms in hostile bids saw 
negative abnormal returns, whereas in friendly takeovers (mergers and acquisitions in the 
above tables) the bidder's shareholders saw positive returns.  
The next logical step is to consider what the combined wealth effects are for both bidder and 
target shareholders. It was discussed above that according to the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a 
                                                            
47 Ibid. 
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takeover is efficient if the winners' gains exceed the losers' losses. Since the premium 
received by target shareholders is so substantial, and despite the target firms often being 
considerably smaller (and thus a lower total market value than the bidder), the net overall 
wealth-effects for the combined shareholders is positive.48 In a 2005 study49, Bhagat et al 
calculated the 'Combined Initial Bid Return'50 (CIBR), using a [-5,+5] day window either side 
of the bid announcement. Their results showed that, target and bidder shareholders 
combined received abnormal returns of 8.43% in the case of hostile bids, and 4.38% for 
friendly offers.51 
In other words, at least in the short term, hostile takeovers are on average wealth-creating. 
At face value, following this logic would assume that a pro-takeover regime that facilitates 
hostile bids is therefore desirable, since they create wealth in the aggregate. Many legal and 
economic scholars have been content to rely on the evidence of short-term wealth-creation 
as proof of the efficacy of the market for corporate control,52 however it is submitted that a 
more holistic approach should be taken in order to accurately measure the benefits of 
takeovers, by considering other measures such as long-term wealth-effects and firm 
operating efficiency.  
 
Long-term wealth effects of hostile takeovers 
Many studies have been undertaken on the long-term wealth-effects of takeovers, 
considering the abnormal returns that the shareholders of the combined firm receive, usually 
over periods of 1-5 years. Unlike with short-term effects however, the empirical evidence 
here is less conclusive. Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) found that hostile takeovers in the 
US outperformed friendly ones. Hostile takeovers had cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
ranging from 0.1% to 1.3% in the three-year post-acquisition period, while the CAR of 
friendly mergers ranged from -0.3% to 0.8%.53 Similarly Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that, 
                                                            
48 Ibid 14 at p796. 
49 S. Bhagat, M. Dong, D. Hirshleifer and R. Noah, 2005, “Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and 
Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 3–60 
50 The combined initial bid return is a weighted average of bigger and target abnormal returns. 
51 Ibid 49 at p34‐35. See also Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) who  report that investors who own an equal share 
in both the bidder and the target one week prior to the event date and sell their entire holdings one week 
after the event day will have earned an abnormal return of 7‐8%. (Study conducted over the period 1963‐84). 
52 Ibid 14 at p796. 
53 J. Franks, Harris, R. and Titman, S. (1991), ‘The postmerger share‐price performance of acquiring firms’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 81‐96. 
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on average over a five year period, stock returns of the acquirer are significantly higher in 
hostile offers as opposed to mergers.54 
With regards to the UK, a comparatively recent study by Cosh and Guest55 found that over a 
four year period, "hostile takeovers result in mildly negative abnormal returns, whilst friendly 
takeovers result in significantly negative returns."56  
The empirical evidence on hostile takeovers is therefore somewhat inconclusive. Some 
studies show that bidder shareholders receive small but positive gains, while others show 
small but negative returns. However the evidence does seem to show two consistent results. 
Firstly, the wealth change in hostile acquisitions, whether positive or negative tends to be 
small ("not significantly different from zero")57, and secondly that hostile acquisitions 
outperform friendly ones over a long time period.  
It is also worth noting that studies of long-term wealth-effects may suffer from 
methodological problems.58 Due to the passage of time, it is difficult for a study to isolate the 
takeover effect from other events which occur in the years subsequent to the acquisition.59  
 
Conclusions on the benefits of hostile takeovers 
It was stated above that hostile takeovers have two classically stated benefits. Firstly as a 
means of disciplining management and secondly, as a means of creating wealth by 
exploiting synergies between the target and acquirer.  
On the first of these benefits, the empirical evidence suggests that hostile takeovers are not 
used as an observable means of disciplining underperforming management. The fact that a 
firm is underperforming does not seem to be a factor which makes it more likely to be a 
target of a hostile bid. Takeovers may still play an ex ante role in disciplining management, 
by threatening replacement if underperformance is perceived, unfortunately it is extremely 
difficult to quantify the effect of a threat on the market for corporate control. 
                                                            
54 T. Loughran, and Vijh, A. (1997), ‘Do Long‐Term Shareholders Benefit From Corporate Acquisitions?’, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 1765‐1790. 
55 A. Cosh, and P. Guest, 2001, The long run performance of hostile takeovers: UK evidence, Centre for Business 
Research Working Paper 215. 
56 Ibid at p28. 
57 Ibid 55 at p28‐29. 
58 M. Jensen, and R. S. Ruback, 1983, The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 5‐50. 
59 Ibid 6 at p15. 
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When considering the wealth-effects for the short-term, the empirical literature is unanimous. 
Studies show that hostile takeovers create wealth in the aggregate. Bidder and target 
shareholders combined receive positive abnormal returns, however this is due to the 
substantial premium received by the target shareholders. Bidder shareholders on the other 
hand see either small negative returns or returns indistinguishable from zero. Evidence of 
long-term bidder wealth changes are less conclusive however. Some studies indicate small 
but positive abnormal returns for bidder shareholders, while others show small but negative 
returns. Once again however, when the initial target shareholder premium and the bidder 
shareholder returns are combined, they are positive in the aggregate.60 
The bottom-line is that hostile takeovers are indeed "basically beneficial", however the extent 
of these benefits should not be overestimated. In particular the disciplining theory of hostile 
takeovers does not seem to hold much weight and the wealth-creation of hostile takeovers is 
captured largely by the shareholders of the target, instead of being evenly distributed.  
Thus, it can be questioned whether a pro-takeover regime is the correct approach when it 
comes to crafting takeover regulation. The BNR and BTR are both designed to facilitate 
hostile takeovers, and are key pillars of a pro-takeover regime. Yet the evidence shows that 
the benefits they provide are perhaps not as strong as many commentators and legislators 
would argue. Is the fact that, on average, takeovers are beneficial, a good enough reason to 
adopt a pro-takeover regime?  
Other observers would answer this question in the negative. Proponents of this view argue 
that a takeover regime should be restrictive - in other words that the BNR and BTR have no 
place in the legislation. The arguments of those who take this position will be considered in 
the next section. Put differently, it will evaluate the economic benefits of a takeover regime 
without the BNR and BTR, i.e. a regime that is takeover restrictive. 
 
2.4 The benefits of a takeover restrictive regime 
A takeover restrictive regime would allow managers to raise takeover defences without 
getting majority approval from the shareholders, effectively giving the management the 
decision of whether a takeover succeeds. Some who advocate this view, argue that hostile 
takeovers can be a disruptive influence on well-functioning companies.61 They argue that 
takeovers can encourage short-termism as opposed to long-term commitments to 
                                                            
60 "The combined abnormal return over both time periods consists of the weighted average of the target 
announcement returns and the bidder overall returns. In hostile takeovers, the return is 5.4%" Cosh and Guest, 
see n55 above at p25. 
61 M. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Financial Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. REV. 1 (1987) 18‐20 
28 
 
shareholder value.62 Along this line of reasoning, it has been put forward that some 
takeovers may result in an undesirable "breach of trust" between management and 
employees.63 According to Becht, 
 
 "if employees (or clients, creditors and suppliers) anticipate that informal 
relations with current management may be broken by a new managerial team 
that has taken over the firm they may be reluctant to invest in such relations 
and to acquire firm specific human capital. They argue that some anti-takeover 
protections may be justified at least for firms where specific (human and 
physical) capital is important."64 
 
Another view is that takeover defences are beneficial because they allow the target board to 
resist the initial bid, using the defences as a bargaining tool to get the bidder to revise, and 
therefore raise, the bid premium, benefitting the target shareholders.65  
These views show that in certain circumstances allowing the target board discretion to 
create takeovers defences may be desirable. Managers are required to act in the best 
interests of the company, however when facing a takeover, this often creates a severe 
conflict of interest. The management best interests and the company's best interests can 
sharply diverge. Often their own performance and plans are brought into question and their 
jobs are in jeopardy. Their motives for rejecting the bid may be driven by self-interest, 
protecting their position and reputation rather than maximising the value of the company for 
the shareholders.66 It has also been pointed out that managers may be cognitively biased, 
being reluctant to acknowledge their mismanagement and explaining bad strategy as market 
misvaluation.67 A combination of self-interest and cognitive bias can lead to managerial 
hyperopia. They may honestly (in the sense that cognitive biases are not intentional)68 but 
incorrectly believe that their view of the company value will eventually be proven right, 
despite temporary underperformance.69 
                                                            
62 Ibid 1 at p3. 
63  A. Shleifer., Summers, L.H. (1988). “Breach of trust in hostile takeovers”. In: Auerbach, A.J. (Ed.), Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes And Consequences. National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report series. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
64 Ibid 25 at p851. 
65 R. Comment, Schwert, G.W. “Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of 
modern antitakeover measures”. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (1995) 3–43. 
66 Ibid 8 at p21.  
67 Ibid 1 at p10. 
68 L Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957). Their bias may be due to seeking more psychologically 
supportive reasons for their personal failure.   
69 Ibid 1 at p10. 
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The markets recognise this hyperopia. By adopting takeover defences, managers are often 
perceived to be entrenching themselves, insulating their positions from a hostile bid.  The 
market often reacts negatively to this, resulting in a fall in the share price.  Numerous event 
studies have been undertaken on the wealth effects of this and generally that the adoption of 
takeover defences results in a negative impact on firm value.70 While it is true that 
sometimes management uses takeover defences as a bargaining tool to increase the bid 
premium their shareholders receive, in the majority of instances this is not the case. The 
latest data71 shows that the net effect of the adoption of takeover defences is negative, 
suggesting the entrenchment effect is greater than bargaining effect.72 
While the aggregate result may be negative, an interesting study undertaken by Cotter et al, 
compares between target firms with independent boards73 and target firms where boards are 
'captive.'74 They found that  shareholders of target firms with independent boards receive 
premiums that are 23% higher than for targets with more captive boards even when 
controlling for the presence of anti-takeover devices. This suggests that independent boards 
are more ready to use anti-takeover devices to the advantage of target shareholders than a 
more captive board.75 
 
Conclusions on the benefits of a takeover restrictive regime 
It is accepted that in certain circumstances, allowing management to decide on whether a 
hostile takeover succeeds can have its benefits. In some scenarios, management may wish 
to commit to a long-term strategy and make specific investments in human capital, and a 
hostile bid would disrupt what may be efficient long-term plans. In addition, the study by 
Cotter et al, above, showed that in some companies with certain characteristics (in this case 
the independence level of the board) management can use takeover defences to get the 
best price for their shareholders.  
                                                            
70 Ibid 25 at p883. 
71 P. Gompers, Ishii,. and Metrick, 'Corporate Governance and Equity Prices' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107‐155,  (2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278920 
72 This is corroborated by comparisons of announcement effects of anti‐takeover amendments with a larger 
bargaining component relative to devices where entrenchment is likely to be prominent. See G. Jarrell, 
Poulsen, . (1987). “Shark repellents and stock prices: the effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980”. 
Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127–168. 
73 An independent board member was brought in from outside the company. Because an independent outside 
director has not worked with the company for a period of time (typically for at least the previous year), he or 
she is not an existing manager and is generally not tied to the company's existing way of doing business. 
74 A captive board is more a like 'rubber stamp assembly' that does not check and balance the CEO and 
management, often because the CEO has a lot of influence over the choice of directors. See Becht, n25 above 
at p859. 
75 J.Cotter., Shivdasani, A., Zenner, M. (1997). “Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth 
during tender offers?” Journal of Financial Economics 43, 195–218. 
30 
 
Overall however, the negatives of managerial self-interest outweigh the benefits of allowing 
management to decide on takeovers. The "great majority of academic lawyers" support this 
view,76 which is also supported by the empirical evidence, showing that the net effect of the 
adoption of takeover defences has a negative impact on firm value. 
 
2.5 An unbiased (neutral) takeover regime 
The economic analysis in the previous sections has demonstrated that hostile takeovers are 
wealth-creating in the aggregate, and that takeover defences have a net negative impact on 
firm value. Therefore, if the choice was simply between a pro or anti-takeover regime, the 
empirical evidence would counsel in favour of a pro-takeover regime. Following this logic, 
mandatory Board Neutrality (BNR) and Breakthrough (BTR) rules within the European Union 
would be desirable.  
More recently however, some commentators have rejected a categorical 'pro' or 'anti' 
takeover stance and instead advocated a more neutral approach. The basis for this is 
simple. While hostile takeovers may be wealth-creating in the aggregate, any individual 
observation can either be wealth-creating or wealth-destructive. Instead of facilitating 
takeovers in general through a mandatory BNR and BTR, a more efficient regime would 
promote the wealth-creating takeovers, while impeding those which are wealth-destructive.  
It has been suggested that the means to achieve this is through a 'horizontal subsidiarity' 
approach.77 Enriques et al point out that any individual companies' exposure to a takeover is 
efficient or inefficient depending on a variety of factors. These factors are sensitive to 
change and will differ from industry to industry, current conditions of the relevant industry, 
the stage of the firm's lifecycle, etc. Thus, a 'one size fits all'78 approach applied by a 
Member State to all companies registered on its stock exchange will lead to inefficiencies. 
Some of those companies in its jurisdiction may benefit from being able to raise takeover 
defences, while others will be most efficient under a pro-takeover regime created by the 
BNR and BTR. 
Therefore, a 'horizontal subsidiarity' approach would dictate that regulation  of takeovers 
should defer the choices made at the level best suited to make a nuanced assessment of the 
                                                            
76 M. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 151, No. 3 (Jan., 2003), pp. 787‐824 
77 Ibid 1 at p3. 
78 See n13, above for why a 'one size fits all' approach is not an option in the EU. See also Clarke, B. (2009a) 
‘The takeover directive: is a little regulation better than no regulation?’, European Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, 
pp.174–197. 
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particular circumstances.79 In other words, it should be the individual companies themselves, 
rather than the Member States, which decide their own level of contestability, as they are 
best placed to decide which regime would be suit them most efficiently. How the BNR and 
BTR could be drafted to support such an 'unbiased' regime will be the topic under 
consideration in chapter 5. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the empirical evidence surrounding the wealth-effects of hostile 
takeovers (and friendly takeovers comparatively). The purpose of this has been to drawn a 
number of conclusions that will enable the crafting of an efficient regime later in the thesis, 
specifically considering if the BNR and BTR are efficient in their current form and if they 
should be altered.  
The conclusions reached are as follows. Firstly, that the 'disciplining' effect that many legal 
commentators attribute and give weight to as a benefit of a hostile takeover, does not seem 
to have a strong basis in the empirical evidence. As Cosh and Guest conclude, "the findings 
on hostile takeovers provide little evidence that the U.K. market for corporate control 
functions as an effective disciplinary device for underperforming companies."80 Therefore, 
one should be careful not to argue this effect as a strong benefit of hostile takeovers. 
Secondly, it is concluded that the aggregate  wealth-effects of hostile takeovers are positive 
for targets and bidders combined, in both the short and long-term. Thirdly, the adoption of 
takeover defences is concluded to have a negative impact on firm value, suggesting the 
markets view defences primarily as a means of managerial entrenchment. The importance of 
these two conclusions will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, but for now it suggests 
that a pro-takeover regime is the most desirable 'default' regime, which companies can then 
choose to opt-out of, if their individual situation warrants it.  
Finally, it has been shown that in some circumstances, usually where the majority of the 
Board is independent, that takeover defences can be used in an efficient way, to raise the 
premium received by the target shareholders, rather than for managerial entrenchment. This 
once again enforces the logic behind an unbiased regime, which will allow an individual 
company to decide what constitutes an efficient level of contestability for itself.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss the BNR and BTR respectively.  It will look at their 
effectiveness and current application under the law, before chapter 5 will build on the 
                                                            
79 Ibid 1 at p3. 
80 Ibid 55 at p31. 
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empirical evidence in this chapter and the work in chapters 3 and 4 to consider how the rules 
could be drafted into an efficient, unbiased regime.  
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Chapter 3 – The Board Neutrality Rule Under Article 9 
 
Chapter Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the implementation of the Board Neutrality Rule (BNR) under 
Article 9 of the Directive. It will first consider the aims of the BNR, by looking at what the 
Commission hoped to achieve with the rule. Next it will look at how the BNR operates in 
practice, and what effect the optionality and reciprocity clauses found in Article 12 of the 
Directive have. The choices this provides both at the Member State and company levels will 
then be laid out and explained, before the actual transposition choices that the Member 
States and companies have made, will be analysed. Once the impact of the implementation 
has been fully assessed, the question of whether the BNR can be called a success will be 
answered, and finally conclusions will be drawn on whether a reform is necessary. 
 
3.1 Aims of the Board Neutrality Rule 
When considering the objectives of the Board Neutrality it is useful to frame it within the 
general aims of the Takeover Directive as whole. The principle objectives of the Commission 
when crafting the Takeover Directive was to promote the integration of the national 
economies of the Member States comprising the "single market" and to enhance the 
competitiveness of European industries against non-European rivals by facilitating takeover 
bids.1 In its 2002 proposal, the Commission wrote, 
"Under the circumstances, the Commission considers it essential to provide a 
European framework for cross-border takeover bids as part of the Financial 
Services Action Plan. Such transactions can contribute to the development and 
reorganisation of European firms, a key condition for withstanding international 
competition and developing a single capital market"2 
Furthermore, the 2005 Financial Services White Paper stressed the need to, 
"consolidate dynamically towards an integrated, open, inclusive, 
competitive, and economically efficient EU financial market” and to “remove 
the remaining economically significant barriers so financial services can be 
                                                            
1 P. Davies, E. Schuster, & E. van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? in 
Company law and economic protectionism: New challenges to European Integration (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf‐Georg 
Ringe eds. 2010). p105. 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Takeover Bids, COM (2002) 534 final, Brussels, October 2002. p3.   
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provided and capital can circulate freely throughout the EU at the lowest 
possible cost.”3 
According to Davies4 although this rationale was supported by the familiar arguments about 
providing a 'level playing field' and enhancing legal certainty, he concludes that the 
Commission's 2002 Proposal for the Directive, or at least the sections of it that were to prove 
controversial, can only be explained on a rationale of facilitating bids and integrating the 
European capital market.5 Further, the two provisions of the Directive which facilitate bids to 
the greatest extent are the BNR and BTR. However the decision to adopt the Directive with 
the proviso that these two rules be optional rather than mandatory was bitterly opposed by 
the Commissioner responsible for the proposal, who claimed that the optional nature of the 
new rules meant the Directive was "not worth the paper it was written on."6 It is therefore 
clear that the competitiveness rationale, achieved by the facilitation of bids, was the 
dominant one in the Commission's mind.7 By preventing management from taking action 
which would frustrate a takeover bid for the target company without obtaining shareholder 
approval, a mandatory BNR would have had a significant impact on the facilitation of bids. 
Since takeover bids are seen as "basically beneficial"8 and Chapter 2 of this thesis 
evidenced that they are efficient in the aggregate9 it can be concluded that the aim of the 
BNR within the Directive is to increase the competitiveness of the European capital markets 
by increasing the contestability of corporate control.  
3.2 Operation of the Board Neutrality Rule 
Takeover defences can be broadly divided into two distinct categories, pre-bid and post-bid. 
The BNR as found in Article 9 of the Directive is related to post-bid defences, which are 
applied once the target company has become the subject of a takeover bid. The following 
table sets out a number of common defences of this type: 
                                                            
3 White Paper ‐ Financial Services Policy 2005‐2010 {SEC(2005) 1574}  
4 Ibid 1 at p106 
5 Not all elements of the Takeover Directive are aimed at facilitating bids, the Mandatory bid rule and Sell‐out 
rule for example are both generally accepted to reduce the likelihood of a takeover occurring. However both 
these rules can be seen as being in line with the 'competiveness rationale' insofar as they prevent inefficient 
takeovers. 
6 V Edwards, "The Directive on Takeover Bids ‐ Not worth the Paper It's Written on?" (2004) 1 European 
Company and Financial Law Review 416. 
7 Ibid 1 at p106. 
8 High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 
2002. The High Level Group further considered that a mechanism for takeovers was basically beneficial 
because of the synergy gains and disciplining function that takeovers provided, stating that these views 
'formed the basis of the Directive'. 
9 See chapter 2 of this thesis, which concluded that both hostile and friendly takeovers were efficient in the 
aggregate, largely due to the large premium received by target shareholders. 
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Defensive Action 
 
 
White Knight 
 
A target company seeks an alternative merger or 
acquisition partner, who is on friendly terms with the 
target management, to buy a majority block of 
shares. 
 
White Square Similarly to the White Knight defence, the target 
company in this scenario seeks an alternative partner 
who is on friendly terms to acquire a minority block of 
shares in the target. 
 
Capital Increase Increases the equity capital of the company, either 
through the issue of new shares or by raising the par 
value of existing equity making a takeover more 
expensive. 
 
Debt Increase The company takes on debt to make itself a less 
attractive target. 
 
Acquisition of Assets The company acquires assets which may be 
undesirable from the bidder's perspective. 
 
Sales of Assets (Crown Jewels) This constitutes the target company entering into a 
sale of its most attractive assets to a friendly third 
party, thereby making itself a less appealing target. 
 
Pac-Man Defence  The target company launches a takeover bid of the 
original acquirer. Often heavily leveraged. 
 
Issue of Warrants ('Poison Pills' and 
Shareholder Rights Plan) 
The target company facilitates the issue of shares to 
its shareholders at a discount, in an attempt to dilute 
the acquirer's  control. 
 
The BNR provides that the board of the target company must obtain post-bid authorisation 
from the shareholders' meeting before taking action which would result in the frustration of a 
bid, with the explicit exception of seeking a 'white knight.'10 Where a company has a two-tier 
board structure, the rule applies to both the management and supervisory board.11 By 
requiring post-bid shareholder authorisation for the adoption of defensive measures, the 
BNR is a bright-line rule which shifts decision making from the board to the shareholders. As 
                                                            
10 See Article 9 (2). 
11 H. Fleischer, 'The Responsibility of the Management and its Enforcement' in G. Ferrarini and others (eds), 
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (OUP, Oxford 2004) 373. Such two‐tiered board structures 
are common in Germany. 
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such, the rule does not prohibit defensive measures, but instead subjects them to explicit 
shareholder approval after an actual bid has been made.12 Rather than being a substantive 
provision, it is a procedural rule and therefore benefits from being analysed within the 
context of corporate law as a whole.13 In other words, the procedural arrangement provided 
for by the BNR is one of a number of possible solutions which allocate decision-making 
authority on adopting defensive measures. Decision making power ultimately resides with 
the shareholders but may be temporarily or indefinitely vested with the management, where 
temporary powers usually only require majority approval while indefinite powers would need 
a qualified majority.14 The figure below shows three different procedural frameworks for how 
a company can adopt defensive measures, with the BNR represented by the middle solution, 
B. 
Figure 1: Procedural Rules for the adoption of defensives measures 
 Time   Takeover Anno       
jhhjgjhguncement 
  
  Management Shareholders  Management Shareholders 
Less 
restrictive 
Solution 
A 
May request 
powers (by 
charter or 
bylaw 
amendment 
Approval by 
majority 
 Not obliged 
to request 
permission to 
use powers 
for defensive 
purposes 
May call a 
meeting to 
revoke 
powers by 
majority 
voting 
       
 Solution 
B 
May request 
powers for a 
limited period 
Approval by 
majority 
 
 
Must ask 
permission to 
use powers as 
takeover 
defence 
(BNR) 
Approval by 
majority 
       
More 
restrictive 
Solution 
C 
May not 
request 
powers 
-  May not 
request 
powers  
May call a 
meeting to 
grant powers 
(approval by 
a majority) 
Source: Based on C. Clerc et al, Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover 
Regulation 
                                                            
12 C. Clerc et al, Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover Regulation (December 11, 2012). CEPS 
Paperbacks at p179. 
13 M. Goergen, M. Martynova and L. Renneboog (2005), Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from 
takeover regulation, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 33, ECGI, 
Brussels, April. 
14 Ibid 12. 
Takeover 
announcement
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The three solutions shown above are not an exhaustive set, but are useful to frame the 
solution provided for by the BNR, with solution A representing the least restrictive regime 
while C is the most restrictive.  
The above figure also illustrates an advantage of the BNR, namely that it allows 
shareholders to reap the benefits of an advance approval of share issues (a power 
commonly used to defend the company) while avoiding the costs associated with such an 
action.15 The reasoning is as follows. The BNR requires the board of the target to seek 
authorisation for defensive measures once they have received information about the bidder's 
decision to launch a bid.16 In such a scenario, where a target board asks permission for 
defensive measures it is perfectly well understood by the shareholders  that such powers will 
be used to 'defend' the company. Similarly when the bid has not yet been officially 
communicated to the target Board but rumours of a potential bid are widespread, the target 
shareholders equally understand that a board's request for additional powers is for the 
purpose of 'defending' the company against the expected imminent bid. Therefore, where a 
bid is official or expected, the shareholder's decision of whether to grant additional powers 
hinges on the expected impact of the anticipated defensive measures on the share price - 
i.e. trading off the benefit of obtaining a higher premium via the increased bargaining power 
of the board versus the risk of management setting-up entrenchment-driven defences.17  
Thus, where the company is facing a hostile offer or one is perceived to be imminent, the 
shareholders can weigh the risks against the benefits and make an informed decision. 
However, problems arise when the company is not facing a bid, whether perceived or actual. 
This is down to the fact that the powers most commonly used to "defend" the company can 
typically be used to multiple purposes, many of which clearly lie in the interest of the 
shareholders18 and are often granted when the company is not perceived to be a potential 
target. In such a scenario, shareholders may grant management powers for the purpose of 
quickly raising finance for the company (e.g the authority to issue new shares), but 
inadvertently pave the way for an opportunistic management to entrench themselves should 
the company become a target further down the line. This problem is summed up by Davies 
et al, "shareholders may have to accept the cost of enhancing managerial discretion in 
relation to a bid in order to reap the benefits arising from management's increased discretion 
                                                            
15 Ibid 1 at p111. 
16 Takeover Directive Article 9(2) and 6(1). Under 9(2) the Member States can also require that such 
authorisation from the board is obtained at an earlier stage, e.g "as soon as the board of the offeree company 
becomes aware that a bid is imminent." This is the case in the UK under r21 of the City Code.  
17 Ibid 1 at p111. 
18 Ibid 
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in a non-takeover scenario."19 This would be the case in a procedural arrangement such as 
solution A (Figure 1, above) however this problem can be overcome by the BNR.  
By explicitly requiring shareholder permission post-bid, any pre-bid powers will need to be 
effectively renewed once a bid is launched. The rule ensures that management cannot use 
additional powers they had been granted for purposes other than that which the 
shareholders had originally intended. Since investors face perception bias and information 
asymmetries compared to management, only requiring pre-bid authorisation as in solution A 
does not sufficiently protect shareholders,20 but this problem is overcome by the BNR, as in 
solution B. Solution C meanwhile does not suffer from this issue but lacks flexibility, 
preventing management from requesting powers that may legitimately benefit the 
shareholders.  
It is of course possible for shareholders to grant temporary powers that are qualified (i.e. 
disapplied if a bid materialises) or to call a meeting to remove said powers, however the 
former presupposes a sophisticated shareholder body and the latter relies on the 
shareholders overcoming their collective action problems and rational apathy. In short, the 
BNR is an efficient way of allowing shareholders to realise the benefits while avoiding the 
costs of advance approval of share issues.21 
 
3.3 Optionality and Reciprocity 
The BNR (and BTR) are greatly complicated by a system of optional choices at both the 
Member State and Company level, due to the introduction late in the day of Article 12 of the 
Directive.22 The two rules were the cornerstones of the Commission's strategy for creating a 
'level playing field'23 in Community takeover law yet remained the most contentious parts of 
the Directive.24 Chapter 1 of this thesis has detailed the difficult path to adoption that the 
Directive took, showing that there was not sufficient political will among the Member States 
to agree to mandatory rules which would harmonise takeover law, resulting in compromise 
that is Article 12.  
                                                            
19 Ibid 
20 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, p301 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm 
21 Ibid  1 at p111‐112. 
22 Winter, J. 2004. 'EU Company Law at the Cross‐Roads'. In G. Ferrarini, K.J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.). Reforming Company Law and Takeover Law in Europe. Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press p18. 
23 High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 
2002. 
24 M. Gatti, "Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive" (2005) 6 European 
Business Organization Law Review 556. 
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Article 12 (1) provides that "Member States may reserve the right not to require 
companies… to apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11." This creates a choice at the 
Member State level allowing for the State in question not to apply the BNR and/or BTR. The 
Directive further requires that where a Member State employs the opt-out provision, they 
must provide a reversible option for companies to opt 'back in'. This company-level decision 
is to be taken by the shareholders in accordance with the rules applicable in that jurisdiction 
for adopting changes to the companies' articles of association.25 
Though the Member States' choice of whether or not to apply the rules is unfettered, the 
language used to express the option clearly shows that opting-out was not the desired 
outcome envisioned by the drafters.26 It was hoped that Board Neutrality would be 'default' 
regime. According to Jaap Winter, the choice of being subject to the rules "sets the 
benchmark", and rather than forcing companies into them it was instead hoped that market 
pressures would provide the incentives for companies to adopt the them.27 In summary, the 
optionality clause in Article 12 allows Member States to choose not to require companies to 
apply the BNR and BTR, whilst allowing companies the opportunity to 'opt back in' should 
they so choose.28  
Reciprocity 
In addition to optionality, Article 12 also introduces a novel concept in takeover law which 
can be found in subsection 3 - reciprocity. Described by Davies as one of the "oddest" 
results of the compromise that led to the adoption of the Directive29, it concerns the question 
of whether a company is subject to the BNR (and/or BTR), dependent on the identity of the 
bidder. Under Article 12(3) Member States are allowed to let companies subject to the BNR 
and/or BTR, refrain from applying those rules if the bidder is themselves not subject to them.  
As with the optionality clause, reciprocity creates choices at both the Member State and 
company levels. If a Member States chooses to allow Companies to use the reciprocity 
exception, then the company through its shareholders can authorise management to take 
defensive actions which would otherwise be prohibited by the BNR. Such authorisation must 
be made no earlier than 18 months before the bid is made public by the offeror company.30 
                                                            
25 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(2). 
26 Ibid 1 at p126. 
27 Ibid 22. See also B. Clarke “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for 
Corporate Control” [2006] Journal of Business Law at p372. 
28 Ibid, B. Clarke nr27 text above. 
29 Ibid 1 at p126. 
30 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(5). 
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The genesis of the reciprocity exception can be found in the concerns expressed by the 
Member States after turning down the Commission's 2001 proposal.31 One of these 
concerns was that a mandatory BNR for European firms would put them on an unlevelled 
footing with companies outside the EU, in particular US firms which can typically employ 
strong defensive measures.  This concern was addressed by The High Level Group in the 
Winter Report. Notwithstanding that they were of the opinion that this concern would not 
manifest,  
 
"the Group believes its proposals would not give American companies an 
unfair advantage when trying to exploit the European internal market… as 
compared with the conditions which apply for European companies"32 
 
 they nevertheless suggested an early-stage form of reciprocity; that Board Neutrality would 
only apply to European firms targeting other European firms, so as not give the US an 
'advantage.'33 However this suggestion was put forward by the Group presupposing a 
mandatory BNR. Instead the reciprocity exception has been attached to an optional rule, 
substantially complicating the whole framework of the Directive and directly conflicting with 
the aim of harmonisation.34 
 
Reciprocity was drafted at a late and contentious stage on the Directive's long path to 
adoption and it is perhaps because of this it was not given the full consideration it required. 
Consequently it has drawn criticism from a vast range of commentators35 who have pointed 
out multiple issues with the clause from both theoretical and practical standpoints. With 
regards to the former, Becht has noted two main drawbacks.36 Firstly, that the rule is under-
inclusive in pursuing a level playing field, as the mere fact that a company is subject to the 
BNR and/or the BTR does not automatically make it contestable. Secondly, reciprocity in 
takeovers unduly restricts the number of potential offerors, by artificially reducing the pool of 
potential bidder companies to those which are themselves open to hostile bids.37 This not 
only decreases overall takeover activity but reduces the scope for instances of competing 
bids, to which the empirical evidence attaches higher bid premia. As such, the exception 
                                                            
31 M. Becht, 'Reciprocity in Takeovers' (October 2003). ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 14/2003. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003.  
32 Ibid 23 at p42. 
33 Ibid 23 at p42. 
34 Ibid 1 at p126‐127. 
35 See e.g Becht 35 above,  
36 Ibid 31. 
37 B. Clarke “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for Corporate Control” 
[2006] Journal of Business Law at p373. 
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weakens the BNR by reducing its facilitating effect and allows for less bidder-friendly 
companies.  
 
From a practical standpoint, Davies has pointed out that there 'unsolved questions' 
concerning the scope of the reciprocity exception38 and different commentators have 
expressed alternative views on the correct application.39 It is hardly surprising therefore that 
a recent publication from the European Company Law Experts (ECLE) contended that 
reciprocity is both "flawed" and "superfluous" and recommended abolishment would be a 
suitable course of action.40 It appears that the reciprocity exception found in the Directive 
was rooted in political policy concerns rather than sound economic rationale. Chapter five of 
the thesis will consider in greater detail the problems of reciprocity when suggesting reforms, 
but for now it is time to turn the focus of attention to the Member States choices in 
transposing the Directive.  
 
3.4 Transposition - the decisions made 
Such a complex system of options available to the Member States has made transposition of 
this particular Directive far more significant than usual. The next logical step is to analyse 
how the Member States have implemented the BNR, and compare this with the pre-
implementation status in order to see if the Directive has brought about change.  
 
The following diagram summarises the choices available at both the Member State and 
Company level under the Directive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
38 Ibid 1 at p127. 
39 For arguments that differ from Davies et al, see e.g J Rickford, "The Emerging European Takeover Law from a 
British Perspective" (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1379. 
40 Böckli, Peter and Davies, Paul L. and Ferran, Eilis and Ferrarini, Guido A. and Garrido Garcia, José M. and 
Hopt, Klaus J. and Pietrancosta, Alain and Pistor, Katharina and Skog, Rolf and Soltysinski, Stanislaw and 
Winter, Jaap W. and Wymeersch, Eddy, Response to the European Commission's Report on the Application of 
the Takeover Bids Directive (November 30, 2013). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 
5/2014.  
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Figure 2: Choices Created by the Directive 
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Source: Adapted from Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report 
 
In certain scenarios, choices made at the Member State level may lead to an absence of 
choice at the company level.41 Therefore the transposition choices made by the Member 
States will be addressed first. Davies et al have carried out a comprehensive study on the 
transposition of the BNR and their data will be used below.42  
 
The following table shows which States transposed the BNR with or without the reciprocity 
exception. Further, while it has been claimed that the transposition of the BNR is a "relative 
success"43 as a result of the relatively high number of Member States that transposed the 
rule, a better indicator of 'success'44 is to consider whether transposition of the Directive has 
brought about material change within Europe with regards to Board Neutrality. In other 
words, is the application of the BNR more widespread pre or post-directive?  
                                                            
41 For example, a mandatory BNR without reciprocity would leave no choice available at the company level. 
42 Ibid 1. 
43 Ibid 20 at p35. 
44 'Success' from the perspective of the Commission. It will be argued later that complete board neutrality 
across the EU is not necessarily a desirable outcome. See section, 'Did the Board Neutrality Rule achieve its 
aims?' below. 
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To answer this question a scoring system has been used to evaluate whether the Member 
States have become more or less bidder-friendly (with regards to the BNR). A higher score 
equates with a higher level of bidder friendliness. It has been calculated as follows. A score 
of (+3) is given for Member States which apply a mandatory BNR, with a further (+1) added 
where the Member State has chosen not to allow for reciprocity. This yields the highest 
score of (+4), representing the most bidder friendly countries which apply a strict BNR, and 
(0) representing the least bidder-friendly, where the BNR is optional and those companies 
opting-in may do so on the basis of reciprocity.45 
 
Table 1: Member State Choices 
 
Country Mandatory 
BNR 
Reciprocity Post-
transposition 
Score
Pre-
transposition 
Score 
Difference
    
Austria Yes No 4 4 0
Bulgaria Yes No 4 4 0
Cyprus Yes No 4 0 +4
Czech Republic Yes No 4 4 0
Estonia Yes No 4 4 0
Finland Yes No 4 0 +4
Ireland Yes No 4 4 0
Latvia Yes No 4 0 +4
Lithuania Yes No 4 4 0
Malta Yes No 4 0 +4
Romania Yes No 4 0 +4
Slovakia Yes No 4 4 0
Sweden Yes No 4 4 0
UK Yes No 
 
4 4 0
France Yes Yes 3 4 -1
Greece Yes Yes 3 4 -1
Portugal Yes Yes 3 4 -1
Slovenia Yes Yes 3 4 -1
Spain Yes Yes 
 
3 4 -1
Italy No* Yes **2 4 -2
    
Belgium No Yes 0 0 0
Denmark No Yes 0 0 0
Germany No Yes 0 0 0
Hungary No Yes 0 4 -4
Luxembourg No Yes 0 0 0
Netherlands No Yes 0 0 0
Poland No Yes 0 0 0
 
Source: Data taken from P. Davies et al, see nr1 above 
                                                            
45 This scoring system has been taken from Davies et al as mentioned above. See Ibid 1 at p29‐39. 
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*Italy has implemented an optional BNR however the default position is reversed, i.e. 
companies must elect to opt-out of the rule 
**The Unique score of (2) given to Italy is explained below. 
 
Firstly it is necessary to explain the result of Italy's score of 2, a result which is formulated 
differently to the scoring system laid out above.46 Italy has altered its national rules regarding 
the BNR multiple times since the Directive has been introduced. Originally both the BNR and 
BTR were implemented as mandatory (quite an astonishing result in the case of the BTR), 
but following the financial turmoil of 2008, both rules were altered to be optional, with 
companies able to opt-in but the default being that neither applied.47 This was altered again, 
but in a unique way in 2009. The BNR (but not BTR) became the default position for 
companies, from which they could choose to opt-out of, with reciprocity also remaining an 
option.48 As a result, Italian companies will be subject to a BNR unless they amend their 
articles of association to opt-out. 
 
An optional BNR with reciprocity would usually result in a score of (0) but by reversing the 
default so that companies must op-out, Italy has created a significantly more bidder-friendly 
corporate landscape, resulting in a higher score of (2). The reason for this is that Italy's 
implementation, though still optional, results in a much more widespread use of the BNR. 
Under the typical mechanism, the body standing to gain from the BNR (i.e. the shareholders 
who wish to capture restructuring and disciplinary benefits)49 face significant hurdles50  
 in securing an opt-in to the BNR. Collective action problems encountered by dispersed 
shareholders are compounded by the fact that opt-in typically requires a supermajority 
vote.51 In short, the opt-in provision for the BNR places the burden to act on the group least 
equipped to do so.52 Italy's implementation however reverses the status quo, so that the 
burden to opt-out is placed on the management, for who no such collective action problem 
exists. Furthermore the 'supermajority requirement' problem mentioned above is alleviated 
by reversal - only 33% of the shareholders is sufficient to keep the BNR in place by blocking 
                                                            
46 The system only allows for 0, 1, 3 and 4 as possible results.  
47 A. Pacces, Rethinking corporate governance: The law and economics of control powers (Routledge 2013) at 
p401. 
48 See Legislative Decree no. 146, art. 1(3) 25th September 2009. 
49 Ibid 1 at p131. 
50 As evidence of these difficulties, to date, not a single European company has chosen to opt‐in to the BNR. 
There are however several instances where the reverse is successful, i.e companies opting out. See below. 
51 Article 12(2) of the Directive requires that the opting‐in decision be taken "in accordance with the rules 
applicable to amendment of the articles of association". 
52 G. hertig and J. McCahery, 'Company and takeover law reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization efforts 
or regulatory competition?' (2003) 4 European Business Organization law Review 179. 
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an opt-out, as opposed to 66% typically required to put a BNR in place under the typical 
regime.53 
 
However, the system in Italy never yields a more bidder-friendly outcome than a country 
scoring (3) which has in place a mandatory BNR, therefore a score of (2) seems to 
adequately reflect the position of Italy's new rule in terms of bidder-friendliness. 
 
Has the Directive brought about change? 
 
The table above compares the position of Member States pre and post-bid. In a 2012 report, 
the Commission stated that it "could be concluded… the Board Neutrality rule is a relative 
success"54 based on the reasonably high amount of Member States choosing to apply a 
mandatory BNR. However it is submitted that this is not a suitable metric of success, as it 
fails to consider if transposition has actually brought about change. An argument could be 
made that all Member States have moved to a more bidder-friendly position, as all 
companies in Member States where the BNR is not mandatory are given the option to opt-in, 
whereas previously they could not commit their management to a non-frustration rule. 
However, Davies et al contend that the collective action and supermajority problems 
(discussed above) make this extremely difficult in practice. These difficulties are so great in 
fact, that they were unable to find a single company which had opted back in, leading them 
to conclude that an optional BNR does not constitute a move in a bidder friendly direction.55  
 
Looking back to the table, it shows that five Member States have moved in a more bidder 
friendly direction, fifteen have maintained effectively the status quo, and seven have become 
less bidder friendly. 
 
 
More Bidder Friendly Equally Bidder Friendly Less Bidder Friendly 
   
Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, 
Malta, Romania 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Sweden, 
UK, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland 
France, Greece, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Hungary, 
Italy 
 
 
                                                            
53 Ibid 1 at p137. 
54 Report from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social 
committee and the committee of the regions Brussels, 28.6.2012 COM(2012) 347 final. at p8. 
55 Ibid 1 at p139. 
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It therefore seems that the implementation of the BNR under the Directive has not had the 
impact desired by the Commission.56 Only five States adopted more bidder-friendly regimes, 
and it is worthy of note that four out of the five have particularly small capital markets, with 
Finland being the exception.57 In terms of facilitating takeover bids, the transposition of the 
BNR appears to have contributed very little. One explanation could be that takeover 
regulation had been on the minds of national legislatures since the boom in the late 1990s58 
and consequently those Member States which were in favour of Board Neutrality had 
already adopted rules with the same effect prior to the transposition of the Directive.59 
 
However, this does not account for the seven Member States which moved to a less bidder-
friendly position post-transposition. For five of these States the shift involved moving from a 
previously mandatory BNR to a mandatory BNR with reciprocity, while in the remaining two, 
the shift was more significant, replacing a previously mandatory BNR with an optional one. In 
these two States however it seems unlikely it was the Directive itself that brought about the 
change, but rather external market occurrences which triggered the move towards being less 
bidder-friendly. In the case of Italy, mentioned above, the 2008 financial crisis was the likely 
cause of the move. For Hungary, it appears that a large hostile bid for a Hungarian company 
in a sensitive sector from a foreign rival was the causal event.60 
 
However, while the Directive is unlikely to be the cause of Italy and Hungary's shifts away 
from a mandatory BNR, the position may be different with regards to France, Greece, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, which all weakened their national forms of the BNR by 
allowing for reciprocity. Prior to the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Directive 
there was no concept of reciprocity within European takeover law. Since transposition of the 
Directive once again required national legislatures to reconsider their positions on the levels 
of corporate contestability, it was almost inevitable that the renewed policy debate would 
result in at least some instances of reciprocity being implemented. Given the resurgence in 
the supporters of economic nationalism this seems even more likely.61 In other words, 
transposition of the Directive can be seen as the direct cause of at least five Member States 
                                                            
56 'Directive on Takeover bids implemented in a protectionist way says Commission' (2007) Company Lawyer. 
57 The market capitalisations of the jurisdictions in GBP are Latvia: 1.15bn; Malta: 2.50bn, Cyprus: 6.3bn, 
Romania: 7.4bn. Collectively these jurisdictions are equal to 1% of the UK market. See Davies et al, ibid 1 at 
p34. 
58 M. Martynova and L. Renneboog, Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe, ECGI Finance Working Paper 
114/2006 at p2. 
59 Ibid 1 at p142. 
60 Act CXVI of 2007 implemented the new regime. Because of the Hungarian company in question, MOL, the 
law is colloquially referred to as 'Lex MOL'. See Davies, Ibid 1 at p38. 
61 K. Hopt, 'Obstacles to corporate restructuring: observations from a European and German perspective' in M 
Tilson et al (eds), Perspectives in Company law and Financial Regulation (CUP, 2005). 
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weakening their rules on Board Neutrality by allowing for a reciprocity exception.62 Now that 
the Member State choices have been considered, it is time to look at the choices available at 
the Company level, and to what extent they have been utilised. 
 
 
Company Level Choices 
 
It was discussed above that choices may exist at the company level, dependent on the 
Member States' implementation, on whether to opt-in to the BNR, with or without 
reciprocity.63 The following diagram illustrates the potential scenarios: 
 
 
Source: Based on Davies et al, see Ibid 1 above at p26. 
 
It was hoped that companies would choose to opt-in to the BNR where the Member State 
had not applied it on a mandatory basis.64 From the shareholders' perspective, the incentive 
to opt-in would be to maximise the value of the shares, by securing the disciplinary and 
restructuring benefits of a takeover. However as discussed above, the supermajority 
requirement combined with the collective action and rational apathy problems faced by a 
dispersed shareholder ownership make this outcome extremely difficult to achieve in 
practice, to the extent that no company has opted back in.  
 
However it could be argued that an incentive exists for management or a controlling 
shareholder to opt-in to Board Neutrality. Companies having acquisition plans in countries 
which do not apply a mandatory BNR, may wish to opt-in so as to avoid potential targets 
                                                            
62 France, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
63 See section above, entitled, 'optionality and Reciprocity'. 
64 See text to footnote 27, above.  
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using the reciprocity exception against them.65 However, the potency of this incentive hinges 
on i) the reciprocity exception being available and ii) companies actually taking up the 
exception. With regards to i), fourteen Member States in the table above (those scoring 4) do 
not allow for the reciprocity exception, automatically ruling them out from using it against 
acquirers thus weakening the incentive. Furthermore, in the seven countries scoring (0) 
above which allow for reciprocity, no company has opted in to the BNR in the first place, 
making the reciprocity exception non-existent in those jurisdictions also. This leaves only five 
countries (those scoring 3) where the incentive has relevance, and out of those, the 
evidence suggests only French companies have any level of engagement with the 
reciprocity exception. 
 
It is now time to consider the two instances of company-level decision making: opt-outs 
under the 'reverse' system in Italy and the use of reciprocity by some French companies.  
 
The situation in Italy has been described above and aligns the implementation of the BNR 
with the more modern theory that default rules should be crafted against the interests of 
management.66 This places the burden on management (or a controlling shareholder) to act 
where it is efficient for them to do so, rather than placing it on dispersed shareholders who 
face coordination problems which in practice prevent them from acting, even where it would 
be in their best interests.67 Management on the other hand has easier access to 
mechanisms by which the default rule can be altered and because the costs of opting out of 
a pro-takeover default would only be borne in the presence of offsetting benefits, such a 
default would be expected to result in opt-outs which were efficient.68 This is confirmed by 
the empirical evidence which shows several Italian companies have chosen to opt-out: 
 
Table 3: Italian Companies which have opted-out of the BNR 
Company Name Market Value 
(million euro) 
Fiat S.p.A 8232 
Banca Carige S.p.A 2659 
YOOX S.p.A 510 
Marcolin S.p.A 273 
Tamburi Investment Partners S.p.A 201 
                                                            
65M.  Siems,. 'The Rules on Conflict of Laws in the European Takeover Directive'.  (2004) ECFR 1 at p460, 
footnote 8. 
66 L. Bebchuk, and A. Hamdani, 'Optimal defaults for Corporate Law evolution' (2002) 96 Northwestern 
University Law Review 489, 513. 
67 Luca Enriques,  Ronald Gilson, Alessio Pacces  The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to 
the European Union) (May 1, 2013). ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 212; Columbia Law and Economics Working 
Paper No. 450; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 444. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926. 
68 Ibid at p21. 
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AcegasAps S.p.A 189 
EL.EN S.p.A 52 
Mondo Home Entertainment S.p.A 10 
Meridie S.p.A 7 
                  Source: Marccus Partners69 
 
 
The other instance of company level decision making can be found in France where, as of 
2008, approximately twenty percent of CAC40 companies had applied the reciprocity 
exception.70 Davies et al submit three reasons as to why this has taken place in France, but 
in no other jurisdictions which allow for reciprocity.71 Firstly, the French legislature 
specifically provided for 'defensive warrants'72 (bons Bretons) as an menu rule, effectively 
allowing French companies to use reciprocity defensively. Secondly the typical shareholder 
structure in French companies is significantly less concentrated than other continental 
European countries (though still much more so than the UK).73 This form of insecure 
blockholding appears to lend itself to an increased interest in strengthening management 
against an acquirer, as such a blockholder finds it more difficult to retain control when faced 
with a bid. Finally, France has a "mini-BTR"74 in place which somewhat limits other forms of 
takeover defences that a company may otherwise be inclined to make use of. Thus, in the 
absence of the availability of these defences, the added defensive protection from the 
reciprocity exception becomes a more attractive option. 
 
In summary, while the Commission had hoped that companies would "push for the optional 
provisions to be applied voluntarily… where Member States chose not to transpose them"75  
and some commentators had expected this to be the case,76 it has simply not happened in 
practice. The incentive for dispersed shareholders is strong, but the steep hurdles they face 
in securing an opt-in have prevented the reality from materialising. Conversely, while 
management or a controlling shareholder would be able to effect an opt-in, the incentives for 
them to do so are very weak - any acquisition programme would be strengthened against 
only a relatively small amount of French companies. For these reasons Davies et al consider 
                                                            
69 Ibid 20 at p190. 
70 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, Overview of defences used by companies listed on the CAC 40 to prevent 
unsolicited takeover bids, February 2008.  
71 Ibid 1 at pp148‐153. 
72 Commercial Code Arts L233‐32.II and L233‐33. 
73 F. Barca and M. Becht, The Control of Corporate Europe (OUP Oxford 2001), see 'Introduction'. 
74 This form of Mini‐BTR prohibits the use of voting caps and restrictions in the articles on the transfer of 
shares. 
75 Report from the commission to the European parliament, the council, the European economic and social 
committee and the committee of the regions Brussels, 28.6.2012 COM(2012) 347 final. at p8. 
76 Ibid 24 at p575 "companies having acquisition plans will most probably opt into Article 9". 
and/or 11 of the DTB". 
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it hardly surprising that there has been a complete lack of company level decision making.77 
However, the fact that Italian companies have opted out of the BNR provides evidence that 
company level decision making can be a viable course of action so long as the right defaults 
are chosen. Indeed, it has been suggested that the most efficient takeover reforms would 
revolve around a form of horizontal subsidiarity.78 A bright-line approach to a mandatory 
BNR implemented at the Member State level provides a heavy-handed approach which 
inevitably results in inefficiencies. Individual takeovers and companies' exposure thereto are 
efficient or inefficient depending on a variety of factors which change over time, from industry 
to industry and company to company.79 Therefore placing the board neutrality decision at the 
company level may well be the best solution, so long as the mechanism is implemented in a 
way which counteracts the existing problems of agency costs, collective action and rational 
apathy. How such a mechanism could be crafted will be the topic of chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion - did the Board Neutrality Rule achieve its aims? 
 
It perhaps seems questionable then, whether the transposition of the BNR can be called a 
"relative success". If the aims of the BNR can be see as facilitating bids and harmonising the 
rules, neither of these appear to have been achieved. In fact, being judged by these 
standards has led to no shortage of critics of the Directive. As far as harmonisation goes, it 
has been described as  "hardly a triumph",80 and "embarrassment for the EU as much time 
and effort was spent to achieve so little."81 This harsh criticism is based on the complex 
system of options and reciprocity which, as Mukwiri writes, creates the very barriers that the 
Directive aims to remove.82 
 
The aim of facilitating takeover bids fares no better. The most common outcome for Member 
States was to retain the status quo. Only five States became more bidder-friendly, while 
others used the transposition to slightly weaken a mandatory BNR by allowing for reciprocity. 
Moreover, Italy and Hungary abandoned a previously mandatory BNR in favour of an 
                                                            
77 Ibid 1 at p147. 
78 Ibid 67 at p3. 
79 Ibid 67 at p3.  
80 P. Scott, The Takeover Panel Report on the Year ended 31 March 2004 (London: The Takeover Panel, 2004), 
p.8. 
81 E. Ferran, Building EU Securities Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.117. 
82 Jonathan Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework: A British Perspective, (Routledge 2009) at 
p7. 
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optional one, and in terms of economic impact they outweigh the five States which became 
more bidder friendly by a factor of three.83 Had the Commission successfully passed the 
Directive they originally wanted, these actions would not have been permitted. Therefore, not 
only can it be concluded that the implementation of the BNR under the Directive did not 
achieve the aims the Commission wanted, if anything it represents a "major setback" by their 
standards.84 Looking at the Community market capitalisation highlights this. The States 
which became less bidder-friendly represent a much higher percentage than those which 
increased bidder-friendliness, as shown by the following chart: 
 
Chart1: Changes in BNR-status and size of capital markets 
 
Source: Davies et al85 
 
The above paints a bleak picture of the implementation of Article 9, however the outcome is 
not necessarily as bad as it suggests. Harmonisation may have been an aim of the 
Commission, however it is submitted that harmonising takeover rules is not a desirable 
approach for Europe. Allowing companies in Member States with different varieties of 
capitalism to preserve their unique comparative advantages would promote a more 
competitive Europe.86 The BNR evolved in the liberal market economy of the UK,87 and 
harmonisation based around transplanting a mandatory form of this rule to the different 
                                                            
83 Ibid 1 at p154. 
84 Ibid 1 at p153. 
85 See 'table 4'  on p156  for dataset in Davies et al, above, footnote 1.  
86 A. Nilsen, The EU takeover Directive and the competitiveness of European Industry, The Oxford Council of 
Good Governance, at p3. 
87 C. Gerner‐Beuerle, Kershaw, D., & Solinas, M, “Is the Board Neutrality Rule Trivial? Amnesia about Corporate 
Law in European Takeover Regulation”, (2011) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, at p2. 
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coordinated market economies in continental Europe is not the best solution. As Sjåfjell 
writes; 
 
 "It seems somewhat paradoxical that, rather than first considering 
rationally the pros and cons of the existing systems of corporate 
governance in Continental Europe, the Commission tries through the 
Takeover Directive to facilitate simultaneously the introduction of the 
Anglo-American shareholding structure and the solution to the problems 
that this very system is perceived to entail."88 
 
Therefore, while the optional nature introduced by the implementation of the BNR may have 
failed to meet the Commission's aims, it has inadvertently laid the foundations for an efficient 
European takeover regime based on choice. The real failure of the Board Neutrality system 
under the Directive is placing that choice at the Member State level and thus failing to take 
into account company specific characteristics which differ across types of economies. 
Further, the reciprocity system was not based on a coherent economic rationale and 
represents a regression in terms of corporate law evolution. To conclude, there is a valid 
place for the BNR in European takeover regulation, however it is in need of reform to 
maximise the benefits in can provide. The next chapter will look at the BTR, which suffers 
from the same faults as the BNR, before chapter 5 builds on this analysis to consider how an 
efficient reform could look. 
 
                                                            
88 B. Sjåfjell, 'Political path dependency in practice: The takeover directive', Nordic & European Company Law 
Working Paper No. 10‐09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=959999 at p7. 
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Chapter 4 – The Breakthrough Rule under Article 11 
 
Introduction 
The creation of a level playing field under the Takeover Bids Directive was driven by two 
guiding principles – shareholder decision making and proportionality between risk-bearing 
capital and control.1 The first of these two principles is reflected in the BNR of Article 9 and 
the general principle of Article 3(1)(c).2 The second principle is the proportionality principle. 
According to this, the greater the degree of risk bearing capital that the shareholder bears, 
the greater their degree of control over the company. Put differently, the greater the risk a 
shareholder is exposed to, the louder his voice should be in determining the manner of its 
control.3 
Within the Directive, this principle is expressed by the BTR in Article 11.4 Certain capital and 
control mechanisms found throughout corporate structures grant disproportionate control 
rights compared to their level of share capital. These 'control enhancing mechanisms' 
(CEMs) can constitute a pre-bid takeover defence and allows for a minority shareholder to 
entrench themselves by retaining majority voting power, for example through the use of 
multiple-vote shares. The BTR allows for a bidder to 'break-through' such mechanisms once 
they have acquired a  75 percent threshold of voting capital.5 The effect of the BTR is to 
introduce a 'one share - one vote' principle during the takeover window, thus limiting both the 
power and use of pre-bid defences. Doing so opens up the market for corporate control, both 
allowing for the disciplining effect of takeovers and facilitating their corporate restructuring 
benefits. The High Level Group envisioned the BTR to work in tandem with the BNR to 
simultaneously prevent pre and post bid defences, since prevention of only one type would 
incentivise the use and prevalence of the other.6 
                                                            
1 High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 
2002 at p2‐3. 
2 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 april 2004 on takeover bids. 
Specifically it states, "the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole 
and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid". 
3 J. Rickford, 'The Emerging European Takeover Law from a British Perspective' (2004) EBLR 1379 at p1385. 
4 T. Papadopoulos, "Legal Aspects of the Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid Directive". takeover 
regulation: a legal approach, Icfai Books, Icfai University Press (IUP), Icfai University, 2008. 
5 Article 11(4), Takeover Bids Directive.  
6 G. Ferrarini  & Miller, G, “A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States 
and Europe”, (2010) ECGI Law Working Paper (139). 
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Much like the BNR however, in order to reach a political compromise the BTR had to be 
made optional for Member States.7 Unlike the BNR however, implementation of the BTR by 
the Member States is extremely low level, with only Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
implementing the rule.8 Moreover, it is generally accepted that the current rule as set out by 
Article 11 suffers from multiple deficiencies, arguably caused by political opportunism at the 
compromise stage.9 The structure of this chapter shall be as follows. Firstly it will consider 
the characteristics of the BTR and how it operates, before going on to give an overview of its 
implementation in the Member States (or lack thereof). It will then critically evaluate whether 
it is deficient, before finally looking at the use of CEMs in Europe and Concluding.  
 
4.1 Operation of the Breakthrough Rule 
Using control enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) allows a minority shareholder to maintain 
himself as a controlling blockholder by dissociating capital and control. Thus, takeovers 
which the majority of the shareholders would be in favour of can be frustrated by the minority 
controller. However, the BTR operates to temporarily, during the takeover window, transform 
a target company with a controlling minority shareholder into a company with dispersed 
ownership for the purpose of facilitating takeover bids.10 In essence, it applies a limited 'one 
share -- one vote rule' during the acceptance period of a bid, and at the first general meeting 
of shareholders called by the offeror (provided the offeror was successful in acquiring 75 
percent of the capital carrying voting rights).  
 
Specifically, once a bid has been made public11 Article 11(2) states that any restrictions on 
the transfer of securities, provided for in; 
i. the articles of associations of the offeree company, or 
ii. contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders of its 
securities, or 
iii. contractual agreements between the holders of the offeree company's securities  
shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for the acceptance of the bid. 
 
Once a bid has been made public, Article 11(3) states that voting restrictions provided for in; 
                                                            
7 C. Clottens & Geens, K  “One Share – One Vote: Fairness, Efficiency and (the Case for) EU 
Harmonisation Revisited”  (2010) at p21. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547842. 
8 Commission Staff Working Document. Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover 
Bids, 21 February 2007, SEC(2007) 268. 
9 Ibid 4 at p10.  
10 Ibid 7 at p19.  
11 Article 11(1) Takeover Bids Directive. 
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i. the articles of associations of the offeree company, or 
ii. contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders of its 
securities, or 
iii. contractual agreements between the holders of the offeree company's securities, 
shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive 
measures in accordance with Article 9. In addition, Article 12(3) explicitly states that multiple-
vote securities will only carry only one vote each at the general meeting of shareholders 
deciding on defensive measures in accordance with Article 9.  
 
Article 12(2) and (3) only apply to contractual agreements entered into after the adoption of 
the Directive.  
 
Article 11(4) provides that, where following a bid, the offeror holds at least 75 percent of the 
capital carrying voting rights, none of the above restrictions referred to in 11(2) and (3) and 
none of the “extraordinary rights” of shareholders in the articles of association concerning 
the appointment or removal of board members shall apply. Furthermore, multiple-vote 
securities will carry one vote each at the first general meeting of shareholders following 
closure of the bid, called by the offeror to amend the articles or appoint or remove 
directors.12  To this end, Article 11(4) further allows the offeror to call a general meeting at 
short notice, provided it does not take place within two weeks of notification.  
 
Article 11(5) states that where rights are removed on the basis of paragraphs (2), (3) or (4) 
then equitable compensation is to be paid to the holders of those rights. However the 
Directive leaves the terms for quantification and delivery to the Member States, which it will 
be argued below results in a significant deficiency of the BTR. 
 
Articles 11(6) and (7) provide exceptions to the application of Article 11(3) and (4) if the 
restriction on voting rights is compensated for by "specific pecuniary advantages" 
(Paragraph (6)) or if the rights are held as 'golden share' by Member States (Paragraph 
(7)).13 There is a danger that the 'specific pecuniary advantage' exception could be exploited 
by companies as a means of evading the application of the BTR, which will be discussed 
below as one of the deficiencies.  
 
                                                            
12 B. Clarke “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for Corporate Control” 
[2006] Journal of Business Law at p367. 
13 See Article 11(7), "Where Member States hold securities in the offeree company which confer special rights 
on the Member States which are compatible with the treaty, or to special rights provided for in national law 
which are compatible with the Treaty or to cooperatives".  
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Optionality  
 
As with the BNR, the BTR is rendered optional at the Member State level by Article 12 of the 
Directive. Despite the BTR being seen as a 'cornerstone' of the Directive by the 
Commission14, the Directive itself owes its existence to political compromise, thus the 
optionality of the BTR (and BNR) was a political necessity.15 
 
Article 12 (1) provides that "Member States may reserve the right not to require 
companies… to apply Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11." This creates a choice at the 
Member State level allowing for the State in question not to apply BTR (and/or BNR). The 
Directive further requires that where a Member State employs the opt-out provision, they 
must provide a reversible option for companies to opt 'back in'. This company-level decision 
is to be taken by the shareholders in accordance with the rules applicable in that jurisdiction 
for adopting changes to the companies' articles of association.16 
As discussed with regards to the BNR in the previous chapter, although the Member States 
are free to choose whether or not to apply the BTR, the language used to express the option 
clearly shows that opting-out was not the desired outcome envisioned by the drafters.17 It 
was hoped by the Commission that Member States would choose to apply the BTR. 
Moreover, the transparency requirements in Article 10 of the Directive are "implicitly based 
on the 'one share - one vote' system, insofar as deviations from this line ought to be 
disclosed."18 'One share - one vote' is therefore the background model for disclosure 
requirements, and thus appears to be an implicit endorsement by the EU legislator of  'one 
share - one vote' being an aspirational, if not legal, principle.19 The Commission hoped that 
market pressures would provide incentives for Member States to adopt the BTR.20 Such 
pressures could come in the form of institutional investors who welcome adherence to a 'one 
                                                            
14 Ibid 1 
15 Ibid 4 at p4.  
16 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(2). 
17 P. Davies, Edmund‐Philipp Schuster, & Emilie van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a 
Protectionist Tool? in Company law and economic protectionism: New challenges to European Integration (Ulf 
Bernitz & Wolf‐Georg Ringe eds. 2010) at p21. 
18 H. Hirte, 'The Takeover Directive ‐ a mini‐Directive on the structure of the Corporation: Is it a Trojan Horse?' 
(2004) ECFR 1 at p10.  
19 G. Ferrarini, 'One Share ‐ one vote: A European Rule?' (2006) EGCI Working Paper Series n58/2006 at p17. 
20 Ibid 1. See also B. Clarke “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for 
Corporate Control” [2006] Journal of Business Law at p372. 
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share - one vote' standard.21  Neither was the Commission's  hope far-fetched - a sharp 
decrease in the use of some pre-bid defences observed in US firms was attributed to 
pressure from institutional investors in a 2010 study.22 
In summary, the optionality clause in Article 12 allows Member States to choose not to 
require companies to apply the BTR, whilst allowing companies the opportunity to 'opt back 
in' should they so choose. 
Reciprocity 
Article 12 further introduces the novel concept of reciprocity. Under Article 12(3) Member 
States are allowed to let companies subject to the BTR, refrain from applying those rules if 
the bidder is themselves not subject to them.  
As with the optionality clause, reciprocity creates choices at both the Member State and 
Company levels. If a Member States chooses to allow Companies to use the reciprocity 
exception, then the company can authorise through its shareholders at a general meeting   
an exemption from the BTR if the bidder does not himself apply the BTR. Such authorisation 
must be made no earlier than 18 months before the bid is made public by the offeror 
company.23  
Reciprocity for the BTR acts in the same way as for the BNR and a brief account of its 
history and criticisms has been discussed in the previous chapter, reaching the same 
conclusions as the ECLE (European Company Law Experts), that reciprocity is both 'flawed' 
and 'superfluous'.24 The next chapter will consider in greater depth whether reciprocity 
should be a characteristic of the Takeover Directive however it is now time to turn attention 
to the transposition (or rather lack of) of the BTR. 
 
                                                            
21 Ibid 19 at p5. See also, Shearman & Sterling, Institutional Shareholding Services, & European Corporate 
Governance Institute. (2006), Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, European 
Commission, Section 5.3 'Comments on the Survey'. 
22 A sharp decrease in the use of Poison Pills and Staggered Boards was observed. See Hill, J. G. (2010), 
“Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance”, ECGI Law Working Paper, 
168 (November). 
23 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(5). 
24 See Chapter 3 of this Thesis, 'Reciprocity' Section. Also, Response to the European Commission's Report on 
the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive (November 30, 2013). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law 
Research Paper No. 5/2014.  
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4.2 Transposition of the Breakthrough Rule 
Transposition of the BTR has been extremely low level by the Member States. Only Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have transposed the rule. With regards to reciprocity, none of the 
States allow for it.25  
Although only three Member States have opted for a mandatory BTR, it should be recalled 
that the Directive allows for a company-level opt-in where the rule is not mandatory.26 
However, to date there has not been a single reported case of a company opting-in to the 
BTR on a voluntary basis.27 This can be attributed to two factors. Firstly the substantive text 
of the BTR as it appears in the Directive is deficient, as will be demonstrated below, thus 
voluntary application remains an unattractive option. 
Secondly and more importantly, the BTR is designed to remove  pre-bid defences which 
confer disproportionate voting rights. Opting-in is achieved at the shareholders meeting, 
essentially requiring the approval of those that it is detrimental to.28 It seems exceptionally 
unlikely that a controlling blockholder would voluntarily weaken their position by opening 
themselves to hostile bids. The only feasible rationale for a controlling shareholder to do so 
would be if the company had acquisition plans, thus opting-in to prevent potential targets 
from using the reciprocity exception against them.29 This incentive however is reliant on 
other companies subject to the BTR applying the reciprocity exception. Since the 3 Member 
States which have a mandatory BTR do not allow for reciprocity, and not a single listed 
company in any other Member State has voluntarily applied the BTR, this incentive is 
currently reduced to zero.  
The following table details the implementation status of the BTR under the Directive, along 
with the Market capitalisations of listed companies. It is worth noting that the 3 Member 
States mandating the BTR have some of the lowest market capitalisations within the EU. 
The total market capitalisation of EU Member States was $10,340,828 Million USD in 2012, 
and the combined market capitalisation of the 3 Member States applying the BTR was 
$7,411million USD,  or 0.071% of the total.30 It can therefore be concluded that the 
implementation of the BTR in its current form has an extremely minor impact on European 
companies. 
                                                            
25 Commission Staff Working Document. Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover 
Bids, 21 February 2007, SEC(2007) 268, annex 1. 
26 Article 12(2) Takeover Bids Directive. 
27 Ibid 24, ECLE Response at p13.  
28 Ibid 25 at p8. (2007 Com report). 
29 M. Siems,. 'The Rules on Conflict of Laws in the European Takeover Directive'.  (2004) ECFR 1 at p460, 
footnote 8. 
30 Data used in calculations taken from The World Bank Group, available at http://www.worldbank.org. 
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Table 1: Breakthrough Rule Implementation 
Country  
 
Breakthrough 
Rule 
2012 Market Capitalisation (Million 
USD) 
UK No $3,019,467 
France No $1,823,339 
Germany No $1,486,315 
Spain No $995,095 
Netherlands No $651,004 
Sweden No $560,526 
Italy No $480,453 
Belgium No $300,058 
Denmark No $224,856 
Poland No $177,730 
Finland No $158,687 
Ireland No $109,014 
Austria No $106,037 
Luxembourg No $70,339 
Portugal No $65,530 
Greece No $44,584 
Hungary No $21,080 
Romania No $15,925 
Bulgaria No $6,666 
Slovenia No $6,475 
Slovak 
Republic No $4,611 
Lithuania Yes $3,964 
Malta No $3,631 
Estonia Yes $2,332 
Cyprus No $1,996 
Latvia Yes $1,115 
Source: Author. Data Source: World Bank Group. Market Capitalisation figures from year 
2012. 
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 As mentioned above, there are a number of deficiencies with the substantive text of the 
BTR. The next section will critically assess these and attempt to explain why the 
implementation of the BTR has been so low. 
 
4.3 Deficiencies of the Breakthrough Rule 
It has been argued that the BTR is deficient in two respects: with regards to the substance of 
the rule and the fact that it has been rendered optional by Article 12.31 As a culmination of 
these deficiencies the BTR has failed to meet the objectives of the Commission and has not 
facilitated takeover activity across Europe. Firstly, the substantive problems of the BTR will 
be assessed. 
 
Restrictions on transfer of shares 
Article 11(2) prohibits restrictions on the transfer of shares. When these restrictions are 
provided for in contracts between shareholders the prohibition is perhaps too wide. 
Papadopoulos points out that such restrictions risk catching normal market arrangements, 32 
such as pre-emption rights and option rights, sale agreements with deferred settlement, and 
irrevocable undertakings to accept a takeover offer (which usually involve a restriction on 
sale of the shares concerned to a 3rd party).33 These are sophisticated financial instruments 
that are often pro or at least neutral to takeover activity and prohibiting them would have a 
negative impact on facilitating takeovers. Not only this, but such deficiencies can be seen as 
direct contributors to the failure to implement the BTR - at the time there was a significant 
lobby group in the UK pushing for the government to opt-out of the BTR so irrevocable 
undertakings would not be prohibited.34 Thus, a blanket prohibition on restrictions on 
transfers goes too far. The Directive would be more effective and more popular with market 
actors if specific exemptions were allowed for financial structures which are takeover 
friendly, or at least neutral.35 
 
Ceiling Shares 
                                                            
31 J. Rickford, 'The Emerging European Takeover Law From a British Perspective' (2004) EBLR at 1389‐90 
32 Ibid 4 at p4. 
33 V. Edwards 'The Directive on takeover bids ‐ not worth the paper its written on?' (2004) 4 ECFR 416 at p437. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid 4 at p5.  
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While it was argued above that the restrictions on transfers of shares is too wide, when it 
comes to categories of securities caught by the BTR, the scope is too narrow. Any category 
of securities outside the scope of the BTR are therefore not 'broken-through' and remain as 
an obstacle to potential bidders.  
The first problem is created by the text of the Directive.36 Article 2(1)(g) defines multiple-
voting securities as "securities included in a distinct and separate class and carrying more 
than one vote each." The issue here is that 'ceiling' or 'time-lapse' shares, commonly used in 
France, are not caught by the BTR. These shares are only fully enfranchised after a specific 
period of time, which can be up to four years.37 From a defensive standpoint, these would 
require a bidder to wait a significant amount of time before their control rights are realised, 
thus making them an effective tool in discouraging acquisition. Even though their voting 
rights vary from time to time, according to the contingency of the duration of a holding, they 
remain of the same class and are therefore not caught by the BTR.38 
 
Non-voting shares 
Another category which evades the application of the BTR is that of non-voting shares.39 
Under the proportionality principle, non-voting equity is clearly a violation and thus non-
voting shares should be appropriately enfranchised to carry their proper weight respective to 
their equity in the company. However, the strict definition provided for in Article 2(1)(e) is 
problematic as it defines as securities only those carrying 'voting rights in a company'. Thus, 
non-voting shares are not caught by the BTR and will not be enfranchised in the hands of an 
offeror in a post-breakthrough meeting, nor will they provide a vote to holders at a meeting to 
decide on defensive measures. This leads J. Rickford to conclude, "a company which 
renders itself bid-proof by keeping voting shares in the hands of the board and its supporters 
and issuing non-voting equity to others is not vulnerable to break-though on that account".40 
To use a basic example; 
Company X has 10 'A' shares and 90 'B' shares. 'A' Shares carry votes while 'B' Shares are 
non-voting. Even if a party acquires all the 'B' shares, assuming 90% of the cash-flow rights, 
they will be unable to apply the BTR and the company will remain in the control of whoever 
                                                            
36 Ibid 4 at p6. 
37 J. Rickford 'Takeovers in Europe ‐ shareholders decisions and open markets ‐ a UK Perspective' in J. Grant 
(ed), European Takeovers: the Art of Acquisition (1st ed Euromoney Books) 2005 at p67. 
38 Ibid 4 at p7.   
39 Ibid 4 at p8.  
40 Ibid 31 at p1392. 
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owns the 'A' shares. Clearly then, non-voting shares are a considerable obstacle to 
contestability of control, which the BTR fails to remove.  
Non-voting shares are prohibited in certain countries, however this inevitably leads to 
regulatory arbitrage where alternatives with the same effect are sought.41 One such 
alternative technique which has the same economic result as non-voting shares is to utilise 
non-voting depository receipts or certificates for shares. Under these financial instruments, 
voting rights are separated from their shares and transferred to an administrator.42 The 
shareholder retains the propriety rights, but the voting power lies with the administrator, thus 
dissociating capital and control. There is no provision in the BTR that voting power reverts 
back to the shareholder in a takeover situation, thus contravening the proportionality 
principle. As a result, even in member States which prohibit non-voting shares, alterative 
mechanisms exist to circumvent the BTR.43 
 
Pyramids and Cross-shareholdings  
Crucially, the BTR does not deal with two of the most effective pre-bid defence mechanisms 
for dissociating capital and control, namely pyramidal groups and cross-shareholdings, 
which are factual structures as opposed to legal structures.44 Pyramidal groups are a 
structure whereby a company holds shares in another company which in turn holds shares in 
another, creating a chain of interposed entities.45 Control of the company at the top of the 
chain allows for outright control of the entire chain (or pyramid). Control of the top of the 
pyramid requires a lower amount of capital than would otherwise be needed to control the 
rest of the companies in the chain. Essentially this fulfils the same economic objective as 
multiple-vote securities: allowing a blockholder to enhance control by leveraging more voting 
power than is proportionate to their ownership share.46 
Cross-shareholdings are another form of pre-bid defence that the BTR does not apply to. 
Two companies buy stakes in each other with senior management and/or owners sitting on 
                                                            
41 J. Maeijer and K. Geens (eds), Defensive measures against hostile takeovers in the Common Market 
(Martinus Nijhoff publishers and Graham and Trotman, London 1990) at p19‐20.  
42 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, p309 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm 
43 Papadopoulos also notes that 'enjoyment rights' common in Germany are another mechanism which acts as 
an alternative to non‐voting shares. See nr4 above, at p10.  
44 Ibid  
45 J. Grant, 'Takeovers and the market for corporate control' in European Takeovers: the Art of Acquisition (1st 
ed Euromoney Books) 2005 at p15. 
46 Ibid 42. 
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each other's boards to vote their shares defensively.47 The BTR does not affect these 
corporate links, but they remain as device to frustrate takeovers by requiring that a bidder 
must acquire both companies in a takeover attempt.  
These two control enhancing mechanisms lie outside the scope of the BTR, which is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, existing pyramids and cross-shareholdings  clearly 
represent a barrier to facilitating takeover bids. Secondly and more importantly however, 
even if a hypothetically effective and mandatory BTR was applied across the Member 
States, controlling blockholders wishing to keep the same disproportionate voting structure 
could simply reorganise their corporate structures into a pyramid structure.48 This theory is 
supported by the example of Belgium, where in 1934 a strict 'one share - one vote' law was 
applied, leading to a sharp increase in the emergence of pyramids.49 Thus, if the current 
formulation of the BTR were mandatory it would still leave blockholders that rely on multiple-
vote shares an opportunity to maintain the status quo by reorganising to a pyramid structure. 
It is therefore submitted that in order for any reform of the BTR to be effective, simultaneous 
reforms that deal with pyramids would need to be considered. This topic is further discussed 
in the next chapter which focuses on reform of the BNR and BTR. 
 
Equitable compensation for 'broken-through' rights 
The Directive provides for equitable compensation for loss suffered by shareholders whose 
right's are 'broken through'.50 Crucially however the directive states that "the terms for 
determining such compensation and the arrangements for its payment shall be set by 
Member States."51 When it comes to applying this provision in practice, difficulties arise 
given that no method of quantification, method of delivery or which party pays is considered. 
In short, the Directive does not address 'how, when or who' pays.52 
Leaving this process to the Member States creates the possibility of inequalities. 
Shareholders may receive different levels of compensation for broken through shares of 
equal value in similar takeover cases based on the particular State's adopted method of 
quantification. 53 Moreover, this inequality may apply to shares of the same company when 
                                                            
47 Ibid 4 at p 11. 
48 Ibid 42 at p196.  
49 M. Becht et al., “Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium”, 
in F. Barca and M. Becht (eds.), The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001, 71‐ 
105. 
50 Article 11(5) Takeover Bids Directive. 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid 4 at p18. 
53 Ibid 4 at p18.  
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they are listed on different stock exchanges. Such an outcome cannot be said to be in line 
with the level playing field that the Commission envisaged.54 
 
Appraisal procedures to quantify compensation may also cause problems with regards to the 
timing of the bid.55 This is especially true if Member States decide to allow some form of 
mechanism for appeals and adjudication. Papadopoulos considers that any delays in the 
quantification process exacerbate the pressure-to-tender problem if the process takes place 
before or during the public offer period. Companies' shares are of course listed on stock 
markets and therefore subject to price fluctuations. A pending quantification process may 
have a detrimental effect on the price of the shares of the listed company.56 
 
 
Conclusions on the shortcomings of the breakthrough rule 
 
It has been established that there a number of deficiencies with the BTR as it is currently 
formulated. The optional nature of the BTR has led the vast majority of Member States to 
maintain the status quo by choosing not to implement the rule. This result is hardly surprising 
given its 'unbalanced' and 'incomplete' nature which is compounded by the uncertainty 
caused by the issue of compensation.57 
 
Due to the lack of implementation of the BTR, it can be said that it failed to achieve the 
objectives set out by the Commission - to neutralise pre-bid defences, create a level-playing 
field and facilitate takeover activity. However, even if application of the BTR had been 
mandatory, in its current formulation it could still be considered a failure.  
 
The BTR was intended to prohibit legal structures which constitute pre-bid defences (as 
opposed to factual structures such as pyramids). However, there are so many exemptions to 
the BTR that Geens and Clottens conclude that "multiple voting rights shares seem to be 
one of the few CEMs actually covered, if not the only one."58 It seems that companies can 
relatively easily evade the application of the BTR by utilising: 
 
i. Non-voting shares 
                                                            
54 S. M. Bartman, 'Analysis and consequences of the EC Directive on takeover bids' (2004) 1 ECL 5, at p8. 
55 Ibid 37 at p72. 
56 Ibid 4 at p 20. 
57 Ibid 7 at p21. 
58 Ibid 7 at p21. Emphasis added. 
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ii. Depository receipts or certificates for shares in countries which prohibit non-voting 
shares 
iii. Ceiling / Time-lapse shares 
iv. Preference shares59 
v. Pyramidal Groups / Cross shareholdings 
 
It has been argued that this wide range of exceptions is a result of political opportunism at 
the negotiating stage of the Directive, where certain Member States were able to effectively 
exempt structures commonly used in their jurisdiction, such as France with ceiling shares.60 
As a result, a mandatory application of the BTR across Europe would produce very uneven 
results - largely affecting Scandinavian countries where multiple-voting shares are 
particularly common, but leaving CEMs in other Member States largely intact. From an 
economic standpoint, it is difficult to justify the selective application of the 'one share – one 
vote' principle only to a selection of CEMs.61 This leads J. Coates to conclude that the 
present BTR would not achieve a level playing field.62 Indeed the BTR was perceived by 
some as so unbalanced that it constituted an "attack on the Nordic voting model."63  
 
 
Use of CEMs in Europe  
 
In 2006 the Commission undertook a study on the proportionality principle in listed 
companies within the EU.64 This study revealed the widespread use of CEMs across 
Member States, as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 1: Presence of CEMs in EU Member States 
                                                            
59 Shares where the restrictions on voting are compensated for by 'specific pecuniary advantage', regardless of 
how small, and thus exempt from the BTR. See J. Rickford, Nr3 at p1392. 
60 Ibid 4 at p7‐8. 
61 Ibid 42 at p309. 
62 J. Coates, “Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?”, 
in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Takeover and Company Law 
in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, 682 
63 U. Bernitz, “The Attack on the Nordic Voting Rights Model: The Legal Limits under EU Law”, EBLR 2004, 1423‐
1437 
64 Shearman & Sterling, Institutional Shareholding Services, & European Corporate Governance Institute. 
(2006), Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, European Commission 
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Belgium 32 16 50% 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 0 10 22 288 8% 
Denmark 23 8 34% 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 8 207 4% 
Estonia 14 2 16% 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 126 2% 
Finland 25 10 40% 8 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 11 225 5% 
France 40 29 72% 23 0 0 7 4 0 0 2 7 44 360 12% 
Germany 40 9 23% 0 2 5 5 1 0 1 1 0 16 360 4% 
Greece 31 16 51% 0 0 1 10 2 3 0 0 2 18 279 6% 
Hungary 22 13 60% 1 0 1 7 4 0 6 0 1 20 198 10% 
Ireland 23 9 39% 0 1 4 0 1 1 1 0 1 9 207 4% 
Italy 39 23 59% 0 0 7 11 3 7 6 1 9 44 351 13% 
Luxembourg 19 3 16% 0 0 1 6 0 1 1 0 0 9 171 5% 
Netherlands 23 15 65% 10 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 16 207 8% 
Poland 40 17 43% 10 0 0 2 5 0 5 0 0 22 360 6% 
Spain 24 15 62% 0 0 0 4 7 1 3 0 3 18 216 8% 
Sweden 29 19 65% 17 0 0 14 1 1 0 5 2 40 261 15% 
UK 40 12 31% 1 0 12 1 2 2 0 0 1 20 360 6% 
Source: Adapted Marccus Partners, nr43 above 
 
This data clearly indicates that the use of CEMs is not uncommon, and the BTR could 
potentially have a considerable effect on the market for corporate control and facilitating 
takeovers. Moreover in a study65 looking at more than 1,000 European companies with dual-
class shares, Bennedsen and Nielsen found 3% to 5% of companies where controlling 
owners held more than 50% of voting rights but less than 25% of the shares. Put differently, 
these firms would be subject to a direct loss of control in the face of the BTR. 
 
A further 11-17% of firms were controlled by less than 50% voting rights and less than 25% 
of the shares, making them subject to a potential loss of control under the BTR. In total, the 
study shows that up to 22% of the firms surveyed would be affected by the BTR. 
 
 
                                                            
65 M. Bennedsen, & K. Nielsen. (2004), “The Impact of a Break‐Through Rule on European Firms”, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 259‐283. 
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
The above data shows that the use of CEMs as a pre-bid defence is common across 
European firms and that a significant percentage would be affected by a mandatory BTR. 
However it is submitted that the current formulation of the BTR is deficient in a number of 
ways and reform would be needed before a new implementation is considered. The various 
shortcomings of the BTR can be summarised as: 
 
i. The reciprocity exception lacks sound economic justification, 
ii. The restrictions on the transfer of votes are too wide, catching pro- or neutral 
takeover financial instruments, 
iii. The BTR allows for numerous legal structure exceptions, such as ceiling shares and 
non-voting shares. This would result in a highly uneven application and an unlevel 
playing field, 
iv. The concept of compensation for 'broken-through' rights is vague and could result in 
unequal results, 
v. The BTR does not provide a solution for factual structures, such as pyramidal groups 
or cross-shareholdings, which allow for evasion of the BTR. 
 
It is submitted that the greatest deficiency of the BTR is the final point - that factual 
structures, particularly pyramidal groups, are not dealt with. The reason for this is simple. 
Even if faced with an efficient BTR, we can expect many firms with a controlling blockholder 
to reorganise their ownership structure to a pyramid structure in order to maintain the status 
quo. Pyramid structures remain a highly effective pre-bid defence and are prohibited in no 
European Countries. It is therefore concluded that a reform of the BTR would need to be 
solved simultaneously with legislation that considers pyramidal groups. The next chapter will 
consider the deficiencies that have been discussed and consider how meaningful reform 
could be shaped.  
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Chapter 5 – Reforming The Board Neutrality and 
Breakthrough Rules 
 
Introduction 
The Previous chapters have evaluated the economic effects of takeovers, the usage of 
takeover defences and how the Board Neutrality (BNR) and Breakthrough (BTR) rules 
operate within the EU under the current regime. This chapter shall weave these strands 
together, in order to propose a reform of the BNR and BTR which would enable the most 
efficient takeover regime.  
The debate on takeover law has traditionally had two conflicting sides. On the one hand are 
those who advocate a pro-takeover regime where target boards are prohibited from 
frustrating bids, thereby leaving the ultimate decision of whether a takeover succeeds down 
to the shareholders. On the other hand, others believe management should be able to block 
a takeover when it is in the best interest of the company to do so. Thus, much of the debate 
has revolved around a simple question:1 should management or shareholders decide on the 
success of a takeover bid? 
The complexities of the issue and the existence of merits on both schools of thought reflect 
the dogged persistence of the debate2 and resulted in the arduous and long-winded path to 
adoption of the Takeover Bids Directive. Even then, the Directive was only passed in a 
watered-down form, constituting a 'flexible-framework'3 approach where the two 
'cornerstones',4 namely the BNR and BTR, were rendered optional by Article 12.  
It will be demonstrated that the optionality element of the Directive was borne out of political 
compromise that necessitated the adoption of the Directive. Consequently, when the regime 
is observed from a legal-economic perspective, it does not appear to be the most efficient 
regime possible. This chapter shall identify what the characteristics of an efficient regime 
                                                            
1 While this has traditionally been the central question of takeover law, such a simplification does not of 
course do justice to the many nuanced positions that have been adopted. See M. Becht, P. Bolton and A. Roell, 
'Corporate law and Governance', in Handbook of Law and Economics (. A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell) eds 
2007) at pp833‐886. 
2 Luca Enriques,  Ronald Gilson, Alessio Pacces,  'The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an 
Application to the European Union)' (May 1, 2013) at p2. ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 212; 
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 450 at p1. 
3 Wouters et Al. (2009) ‘The European Takeover Directive: a commentary’, in Hooghten P.V. (Ed.): The 
European Takeover Directive and Its Implementation, pp.3–76, Oxford University Press, New York. 
4 Described as 'Cornerstones' by the Winter Group. High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on 
Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 2002. 
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entail with regards to takeover defences, before presenting a case for the reform of the BNR 
and BTR in-line with these characteristics.  
 
5.1 The Characteristics of an Efficient Takeover Regime - A Neutral 
Approach 
 
Defining an 'efficient' takeover 
First of all it would be pertinent to set a definition of an 'efficient' takeover. For the purposes 
of this thesis and as was used in the economic analysis of the second chapter, efficiency will 
be measured in terms of gains or losses in shareholder value. The rise or fall in share price 
yields a useful evaluation criterion and is the norm in financial theory.5 Put differently, the 
'success' of a takeover will be judged on whether the winner's gains exceed the loser's 
losses in terms of shareholder value.6 If the cumulative shareholder value of target and 
bidder is positive, then the particular takeover can said to be value-increasing, i.e. efficient. 
Using this criterion naturally does not account for the interests of other constituencies on 
which the takeover may have an effect (such as employees, local communities, customers, 
etc). This is not to say that such stakeholders are unimportant, but rather academic opinion 
suggests that takeover regulation is not the best available means  of safeguarding these 
stakeholder's interests.7 As such, they are not factored in when deciding if a takeover is 
efficient for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
Shareholder versus Director Primacy: A Summary 
The traditional debate on takeover law has been whether management or shareholders 
should decide on tender offer. In this respect, two countries with the most vibrant and active 
takeover markets, the UK and the US, have strikingly different regulation of defensive 
mechanisms. In the UK, defences are essentially prohibited, leaving the decision to the 
                                                            
5 M Martynova & L Renneboog, ‘A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and 
Where Do We Stand?’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 2148 at p2156. 
6 This is known as the kaldor‐Hicks efficiency and states that a transaction is efficient if the winners could 
compensate the losers and still be better off. See John R Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 
ECON J 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, ECON J 549 (1939). 
7 This view has been submitted by Enriques et al, see nr2 above, at p7‐8. 
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shareholders, whereas Delaware jurisprudence in the US allows management to enjoy 
access to a range of defensive actions, albeit subject to an enhanced judicial standard.8  
The debate between shareholder or management primacy persists due to the legitimate 
benefits that both regimes are purported to have by their advocates.9 The two positions were 
analysed in chapter 2 of this thesis and a brief summary is presented as follows. 
Those who argue in favour of a takeover restrictive regime that allows management to raise 
takeover defences without shareholder approval cite a number of advantages. Firstly, it has 
been argued that implementing takeover defences discourages short-termism, allowing 
management to credibly commit to a long-term strategy and make specific investments in 
human capital.10 In this respect, hostile bids can represent a disruptive influence on well 
functioning companies.11  
Another frequent argument is that raising takeover defences allows the board to extract 
higher premia for the shareholders in the event of a takeover. Unlike shareholders, the board 
does not face collective action problems and can act as a central negotiator on behalf of the 
company.12 By using the defences as a bargaining tool, management can force a bidder to 
revise and increase an offer, thereby generating greater shareholder value.13 It has been 
argued that the use of defences not only reinforces the Board's bargaining power in the case 
of a hostile takeover, but also in a friendly deal, where the target can counter the acquirer's 
implicit threat to 'go hostile' if a deal cannot be reached.14 
The final argument supporting director primacy holds particular weight in light of the recent 
financial crisis. The 'efficient market hypothesis' states that the market participants act 
rationally and arbitrage eliminates pricing anomalies.15 Consequently, it posits share price is 
an accurate reflection of the intrinsic value of the company.16 However since reaching its 
                                                            
8 A. Seretakis, 'Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the United States: A 
Case Against the United States Regime' (October 26, 2013). The Ohio State Entrepreneurial Business Law 
Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013. 
9 Arguing in favour of shareholder primacy see e.g. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 
93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007). On the other hand, Stout and Blair put forward an articulate argument in favour of 
director primacy, Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, 'Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate 
Law' (2006) 31 J. CORP. L. 719. 
10 Ibid 2 at p3.  
11 M. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Financial Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. REV. 1 (1987) 18‐20 
12 Ibid 8 at p274.  
13 R. Comment, Schwert, G.W. “Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of 
modern antitakeover measures”. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (1995) 3–43. 
14 M. Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, (2002) 55 STAN. L. REV. 819, 823  
15 Fama, EF “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” (1970) 25 Journal of Finance 
383.   
16 Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, (2002) 27 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1, 1 at p7. 
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apogee in the 1980s, this theory received widespread17 criticism and it is now widely 
accepted that markets do act irrationally and shares can be mispriced. Ergo, while a bid 
above the market value of the shares may appear beneficial for shareholders, it may in fact 
be coercive in nature as it is lower than the 'intrinsic value' of the firm.18 The argument states 
that management, who are better placed to understand the true value of the firm, should be 
armed with the ability to defend against such takeover bids which are undervalued. 
In summary, the arguments in favour of director primacy allow for management to commit to 
long-term strategy, generate higher bid premia and protect the firm from undervalued bids.  
 
On the other hand, shareholder primacy is widely accepted to have two significant benefits.19 
Firstly it works as an external corporate governance mechanism to discipline 
underperforming managers. Theory suggests that dispersed shareholders face rational 
apathy and collective action problems and therefore lack the means to discipline an 
underperforming management. As such, the High Level Group in its 2002 report concluded 
that “actual and potential takeover bids are an important means to discipline the 
management of listed companies with dispersed ownership… Such discipline of 
management… is in the long term in the best interests of all stakeholders and society at 
large.”20 As a shareholder primacy regime requires shareholder consent for defences, this 
further prevents cases of takeover defences being used as a managerial entrenchment 
device, alleviating the conflict of interest that the board often faces during a hostile bid.  
The second advantage of a pro-takeover regime is that it allows for wealth-creating 
takeovers to occur through synergistic gains. Here, contestability of corporate control serves 
a more general efficiency purpose.21 In some scenarios, the target's assets will be of unique 
value to the acquirer, allowing them to create value through synergy gains of the combined 
assets,22 which even the most talented managers of the target by themselves would not be 
able to achieve. 
 
                                                            
17 A. White, Reassessing the Rationales for the Takeover Bids Directive's Board Neutrality Rule ( 2012). 
European Business Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 23, 2012 at 793. 
18 Ibid 8 at p275. 
19These are the benefits identified by the Winter group in its 2002 report. See, High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 2002.  
20 Ibid at p19. 
21 P. Davies, Edmund‐Philipp Schuster, & Emilie van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a 
Protectionist Tool? in Company law and economic protectionism: New challenges to European Integration (Ulf 
Bernitz & Wolf‐Georg Ringe eds. 2010) at p13. 
22 R Romano, ‘A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation’ (1992) 9 Yale Journal of Regulation 119, 
125‐129. 
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The advantages of the two regimes have been laid out above. On the one hand, it is argued 
that takeover defences can allow management to secure higher premia, block undervalued 
bids and discourage short-termist approaches. On the other hand, prohibiting defences 
opens up the market for corporate control, allowing for underperforming management to be 
disciplined and also enabling wealth-creation through synergistic gains from bidder and 
target combined. It is widely accepted that both regimes have their merits, as is clear from 
the persistent and ongoing debate. The empirical economic evidence analysed in the second 
chapter drew a number of conclusions  on these merits and these will now be used to help 
shape a more efficient regime than either a categorical pro or anti-takeover approach.  
 
The Economic Evidence: Grounds for a Neutral Approach 
The economic evidence analysed in chapter 2 drew a number of conclusions. Firstly, it is 
submitted that much of the academic literature attaches too much weight to the 'disciplining 
effect' of hostile takeovers. The empirical evidence shows that poor performance variables 
contribute little to nothing in determining whether or not a company would be the target of a 
hostile bid.23 Put differently, managerial underperformance does not appear to be a motive 
for acquirers. Nevertheless it would be wrong to dismiss the theory outright. Since the data 
only applies to actual (observable) bids, the disciplining effect may still play an ex ante role 
on incumbent managers, as the threat of replacement if perceived to be underperforming 
provides an incentive to operate the company efficiently.24 It is still capable of acting as a 
disciplinary force, but perhaps on a less comprehensive scale than is often purported.25 
Secondly are the conclusions drawn about the wealth effects of takeovers and defences. It 
was concluded that the aggregate  wealth-effects of hostile takeovers are positive for targets 
and bidders combined, in both the short and long-term.26 It is worth noting however, that this 
is largely due to the significant premium that target shareholders receive, with bidder gains 
being largely indistinguishable from zero.27 On the question of takeover defences, the 
empirical studies surveyed show that on average, their adoption has a negative impact on 
                                                            
23 For a study of US companies see, G. Schwert, . “Hostility in takeovers: in the eyes of the beholder?” Journal 
of Finance (2000) 55, 2599–2640; For the same result based on a study of UK companies, see J. Franks, Mayer, 
C.  “Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure”. Journal of Financial Economics (1996) 40, 163‐
181.  
24 G. Tsagas, EU Takeover Regulation: One Size Can't Fit All (November 1, 2010). International Journal of Private 
Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.171–184, January 2011 at p178. 
25 B Clarke, 'Reinforcing the Market for Corporate Control' (2010) UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology and 
Socio‐Legal Studies, Research Paper 39/2010 at p2. 
26 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a survey of a number of studies, sections entitled, 'Short‐term wealth effects 
of hostile takeovers' and 'long‐term wealth‐effects of hostile takeovers'. 
27 Ibid. 
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firm value.28 It appears the market perceives takeover defences as managerial entrenchment 
devices rather than a collective bargaining tool.29 However, while the aggregate result of 
adopting takeover defences is a decline in firm value, studies have shown that in particular 
circumstances they are legitimately used by the board for the benefit of the shareholders.30 
Based on the above conclusions, it can be said that the economic evidence counsels in 
favour of choosing a 'pro-takeover' regime, that assigns the decision making right to 
shareholders and overall facilitates takeover activity.31 Since takeovers are wealth creating in 
the aggregate, and takeover defences have a negative impact, in a categorical 'pro versus 
anti-takeover debate' prohibiting defences would be the better option. The central problem 
here is that it leads to inefficiencies where companies are locked into a regime that prohibits 
them from raising defences which would be beneficial under certain circumstances.32  
The most desirable regime of all would require that firms adhere to 'pro-takeover' rules for 
the most part, but allows for deviation from this when it is efficient to do so. Thus, the 'pro 
versus anti' debate represents a false dichotomy and instead a neutral approach would be a 
positive advancement for European takeover regulation. While the Winter Group concluded 
that; 
"any regime which confers discretion on a board to impede or facilitate a 
bid inevitably involves unacceptable cost and risk"33 
 
it is respectfully submitted that this is not the case. A blanket prohibition on the board to 
implement defences creates inefficiencies unnecessarily. Moreover, a study by Arcot and 
                                                            
28 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Law and Governance, in Handbook of law and 
Economics, p879 (A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell eds., 2007); and P. Gompers, Ishii,. and Metrick, 
'Corporate Governance and Equity Prices' Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107‐155,  
(2003). 
29 G. Jarrell, Poulsen, . (1987). “Shark repellents and stock prices: the effects of antitakeover amendments since 
1980”. Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127–168. 
30 See Chapter 2 of this thesis and; J.Cotter., Shivdasani, A., Zenner, M. (1997). “Do independent directors 
enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?” Journal of Financial Economics 43, 195–218. 
31 Ibid 2 at p7  
32 At first glance it may appear that the BNR accommodates for this, by allowing the board to raise defences 
post‐bid with shareholder approval. But, for example, requiring management to convince shareholders of the 
validity of their long‐term strategy while there is an offer on the table, that greater value will be achieved 
through long‐term growth options and/or that any underperformance is temporary, represents a rather 
considerable risk on the management's part. So much so in fact, that this may deter management from 
committing to such a strategy or making certain types of investment (e.g. human capital) in the first place. This 
point is elaborated on, below 
33 Ibid 4 at p21 (HLG) 
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Bruno34 considered the operational performance of companies which deviated from best 
practice under the UK Corporate Governance Code35 and found that companies which 
deviate from established best practice and provided genuine reasons for doing so 
"outperform all others", including those which were fully compliant.36 While this conclusion 
should be not extrapolated across and used as evidence in the realm of takeover defences, 
it is worth considering that denying companies the opportunity to deviate from the aggregate 
best regime, may result in preventing them from operating at their maximum potential.  
 
 The question is therefore how to design takeover rules which only allow for deviations which 
are 'efficient'. It is submitted that the way to achieve this is through a flexible regime, that 
allows for opt-outs at the company level, crafted in a way that enables those who would 
benefit from opt-out to successfully utilise them. At first glance this may appear similar to the 
current Directive, but it can be differentiated in two important ways. Firstly decision-making is 
removed at the Member State level and placed entirely at the company level and secondly, 
the opt-out is reversed, placing the onus the management to effect a change as opposed to 
the shareholders. The following sections will analysis why these changes would represent a 
better takeover regime. 
 
The Value of Decision Making at the Company Level 
An individual company's exposure to takeovers is efficient or inefficient based on a variety of 
factors. For example these can include the relevant industry, current market conditions or 
stage of a company's life cycle. These all may differ from company to company and over 
time, meaning so too will the company's appropriate stance to takeovers differ.37 As such, it 
is argued that mandatory rules adopted at the Member State level which are insensitive to 
context are not the correct approach. The choice of defences should be made at a level 
which is best suited to make a nuanced assessment of the situation and relevant 
circumstances.38  
A further reason to delegate opt-out choice to the company level, is that history has shown 
that choice at the Member State level is largely influenced by national economic 
                                                            
34 S. Arcot and Bruno, Valentina, One Size Does Not Fit All, After All: Evidence from Corporate Governance 
(January 15, 2007). 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947 
35 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, June 1998.  
36 Ibid 34 at p25  
37 Ibid 2 at p3. 
38 Ibid. 
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protectionism.39As evidence of this, the following table used in chapter 3 shows how the 
BNR was implemented at the Member State level. Seven Member States became 'less 
bidder friendly', either through disregarding a previously mandatory BNR, or qualifying a 
mandatory with the reciprocity exception. The Commission even admitted that the Directive 
may have created new barriers to takeovers, in direct contravention of its objective of 
removing them.40 
More Bidder Friendly Equally Bidder Friendly Less Bidder Friendly 
   
Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Malta, 
Romania 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Sweden, 
UK, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland 
France, Greece, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Hungary, Italy 
 
Removing the decision making element from the Member State level avoids the protectionist 
stance that would inevitably emerge.41 Member States' policies are prone to influence and 
lobbying from managers and purely national elites, but the effect is much less at the 
supranational level.42 Thus, setting the default regime at the EU level instead of the Member 
State level helps to alleviate this political economy problem. 
 
5.2 Reforming the opt-out and the default Rule 
It has been stated above that the most efficient choice on takeover defences is taken at the 
company level. The next logical step is therefore to consider what the default rules should be 
that companies can choose to opt-out from. The importance of default rules needs to be 
stressed for a number of reasons. Firstly, setting the right default rules will save on 
transaction costs. Opting-out of a default will bring with it associated transaction costs43 
(though these will be outweighed by the benefit of opting-out). One of the great values of 
selecting the correct default rules is that it allows parties, by remaining silent, to costlessly 
adopt the most efficient regime.44 Put simply, the default rule should be selected on an 
aggregate efficiency basis in order to benefit the majority, thereby saving on the transaction 
                                                            
39Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, Commission Staff Working Document, 
Brussels 21/02/07 at p10. See also, 'Directive on Takeover bids implemented in a protectionist way says 
Commission' (2007) Company Lawyer 28 (6) p179‐180 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid 2 at p3.  
42 G Ferrarini and G Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and in 
Europe, Working Paper No. 139/2009. 
43 I. Ayres,' Regulating Opt‐out: An Economic theory of altering Rules' (2012) 121 Yale L.J. 2032. 
44 Ibid at p47.  
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costs of opting-out. Based on the economic conclusions drawn above, this means default 
rules which restrict defences.  
Secondly default rules in corporate law  tend to be 'sticky'.45 Studies show that even where 
companies are given significant freedom of contract in corporate law, they rarely deviate 
from the default, to such an extent that "default rules may often be nearly as influential as 
mandatory rules."46  
It is therefore of central importance to choose the most efficient default. The economic 
analysis above concluded that takeovers in the aggregate result in positive value and 
adopting defences results in negative value. Thus, on an aggregate efficiency basis, rules 
which restrict takeover defences by assigning decision-making to the shareholders should 
be the default. Individual companies may then choose to opt-out of these restrictions and 
adopt defences when it is efficient for them to do so.  
One may point out that under the current takeover Directive, the regime also allows for 
decision making at the company level. Where the BNR and BTR are not mandatory, 
companies may decide to opt-in47 and it was hoped by the Commission that this would be 
the case.48 Yet to date there has not been a single observation of this occurring.49 One may 
then question why such opt-ins have not taken place where it would be efficient for the 
company to do so, and why the proposed reform would fare any differently if defaults are 
indeed 'sticky'. It is submitted that the answer is because the onus to initiate the opt-out 
under the proposed changes would be placed on the management, unlike the present 
regime where it is placed on the shareholders. In the current regime when placed on the 
shareholders, opting-in represents such a difficult hurdle that the choice is almost rendered 
illusory. 50 The shareholders who stand to gain from opting-in to the BNR or BTR (i.e through 
capturing restructuring and disciplinary benefits)51 face significant hurdles in securing an opt-
in to the BNR. Collective action problems encountered by dispersed shareholders are 
compounded by the fact that opt-in typically requires a supermajority vote.52 In short, the opt-
                                                            
45 See Henry Hansmann, 'Corporation and Contract' (2006) 8 American Economics and Law Review, 1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(2) ‐ "Where Member States make use of the option provided for in 
paragraph 1, they shall nevertheless grant companies … the option, which shall be reversible, of applying 
Article 9(2) and (3) and/or Article 11". 
48 J. Winter, “EU Company Law at the Cross‐Roads” in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at p18. 
49 Marccus Partners, The Takeover Bids Directive Assessment Report, p302 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm 
50 As evidence of these difficulties, to date, not a single European company has chosen to opt‐in to the BNR.  
51 Ibid 21 at p26. 
52 Article 12(2) of the Directive requires that the opting‐in decision be taken "in accordance with the rules 
applicable to amendment of the articles of association". 
77 
 
in provision for the BNR places the burden to act on the group least equipped to do so.53 The 
Board of course possesses the necessary means to initiate an opt-out, but they have no 
incentive to opt-out of a regime which already favours them, into one that does not. This is 
evidenced by the fact that not a single company opted in to the BNR or BTR. 
According to Bebchuk and Hamdani this imbalance between management and shareholders 
results in a "fundamental asymmetry"54 which needs to be addressed when designing default 
rules. They contend that where there is a choice between two default arrangements, one 
more restrictive and one less restrictive with respect to management, selecting the more 
restrictive arrangement is the better option.55 This is because, 
 "If the restrictive arrangement is chosen, and then turns out to be inefficient, 
relatively little will  be lost because both shareholders and managers will 
support a charter amendment opting out of  this inefficient arrangement. In 
contrast, when opting out requires a charter amendment, if the  non-
restrictive arrangement is chosen and then turns out to be inefficient, it 
might often persist despite its inefficiency."56 
The complete lack of companies opting-in to the BNR or BTR is a good example of  
inefficient pro-management arrangement persisting. On the other hand, recent empirical 
studies in the US found that companies do opt-out of management restrictive regimes.57 
There are two further examples from Europe which provide evidence that company-level 
decision making will occur under the proposed regime. 
Firstly, Davies et al identified significant company level decision making among CAC 40 
companies in France,58 with regards to the reciprocity exception where as of 2008, 
approximately twenty percent of CAC40 companies had applied it.59  Taking up the 
reciprocity exception would allow target management to disapply the BNR in certain 
circumstances, effectively making it a 'pro-management' arrangement. This clearly shows 
that management will opt-out of defaults when they are biased against them. 
                                                            
53 G. hertig and J. McCahery, 'Company and takeover law reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization efforts 
or regulatory competition?' (2003) 4 European Business Organization law Review 179. 
54 LA Bebchuk and A Hamdani, ‘Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution’ (2002) 96 Northwestern 
University Law Review 489 at p493. 
55 Ibid at p494. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Y. Listokin, 'What do corporate defaults and menus do? An empirical examination', (2009) 6 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 279.  It was shown that opting‐out was even more frequent in the presence of 
statutory menu rules. 
58 Ibid 21 at p54. 
59 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, Overview of defences used by companies listed on the CAC 40 to prevent 
unsolicited takeover bids, February 2008.  
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A second and more compelling example can be found in Italy, where the State has applied 
the BNR uniquely as opposed to all other Member States and in way which is in line with the 
changes proposed in this thesis. In Italy, the BNR is the default arrangement, from which 
companies may opt-out by amending their articles of association60. The following table 
shows the companies which have done so: 
Italian Companies which have opted-out of the BNR 
Company Name Market Value 
(million euro) 
Fiat S.p.A 8232 
Banca Carige S.p.A 2659 
YOOX S.p.A 510 
Marcolin S.p.A 273 
Tamburi Investment Partners S.p.A 201 
AcegasAps S.p.A 189 
EL.EN S.p.A 52 
Mondo Home Entertainment S.p.A 10 
Meridie S.p.A 7 
                  Source: Marccus Partners61 
 
This outcome, together with the similar lack of companies opting in to the BNR or BTR in 
Member States where they are not mandatory, therefore matches the theoretical and 
empirical prediction that companies will not opt-in to management restrictive regimes, but will 
opt-out of them.62 It is therefore submitted that if the proposed changes were applied across 
the EU, i.e. making the defaults management-restrictive, then similar levels of company level 
decision making  could be expected across the other Member States to those in Italy. 
 
'Efficient' opt-outs 
Both the theory and evidence indicate that Company level Opt-outs will take place. If 
management initiates these opt-outs however, it can be questioned whether they will be 
done for the 'right' reasons. In other words, opting-opt of a BNR or BTR so that the company 
can implement a long-term strategy, or so that the board can collectively negotiate higher 
premiums for the shareholders may be desirable, but opting-out for self-dealing purposes 
(i.e. managerial entrenchment) would not be. While it may be unrealistic to assume that only 
the desirable opt-outs will occur, it is suggested that the majority of instances will be 
desirable for the following reasons. 
                                                            
60 LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 58 OF 24 FEBRUARY 1998 Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 104. 
61 Ibid 25 at p190. 
62 Ibid 2  at p39.  
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Firstly, shareholders bodies are made up of increasingly sophisticated investors.63 The 
adoption of takeover defences is generally associated with negative returns for 
shareholders64 and therefore likely to make shareholders wary of approving amendments to 
the articles of association which allow for takeover defences. However, a study carried out 
by Arcot and Bruno, shows that where companies deviate from best practice and provide 
genuine reasons for doing so, they have the highest performance metrics of all companies, 
even the ones that fully comply.65 Thus, where management is able to present convincing 
reasons for an opt-out, shareholder approval should act as an effective screen for 'efficient' 
scenarios.  
Secondly, seeking shareholder authorisation for allowing defensive action by opting-out is 
not a straightforward task. If management cannot present satisfactory reasons for opting-out 
it carries the risk of shareholders rejecting the resolution, in which case the management 
may simply have signalled to the market that they are a potential takeover target.66 The risk 
carried with such outcomes will serve to constrain instances of managerial opportunism. 
 
Conclusions on a 'neutral' approach 
A takeover regime which sets default rules at the supranational level, but allows for opt-outs 
at the company level, creates an arrangement which neither promotes nor impedes 
takeovers but allows for a tailored decision to be made at the level best suited to make a 
nuanced assessment of the particular circumstances.67  
This places central importance on choosing the 'correct' default rules. Selecting the rule 
which benefits the majority of companies means only a minority of companies will need to 
opt-out, saving on transaction costs. Further, the costs associated with opting-out will only 
be borne in the presence of offsetting benefits. Unlike the current regime implemented by the 
Directive, it has been demonstrated why the proposed opt-out regime will actually see 
instances of company level decision-making. Theory explains that management will not opt-
in to a regime which restrains them, but will opt-out of one that does. Empirical studies as 
                                                            
63 See Luca Enriques, nr 2, above." By the late 2000s, for example, institutional investors held over 70 percent 
of the outstanding shares of the 1000 largest U.S. public corporations and the ten largest institutions owned 
more than 25 percent of the outstanding shares in many large public corporations." at p3. 
64 P. Gompers, Ishii,. and Metrick, 'Corporate Governance and Equity Prices' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107‐155,  (2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278920 
65 Ibid 34 at p25.  
66 Ibid 21 at p46. Davies also notes that similar resolutions for pre‐bid defences have in the been withdraw for 
fear that they would not be accepted by the shareholders. Resolutions for defensive measures which were 
passed also had some of lowest levels of support. 
67 Ibid 2 at p3. 
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well as the example of Italy provide real-world evidence of this. The 'opt-in' mechanism 
under the current Directive was a result of political necessity. Making Articles 9 and 11 (BNR 
and BTR) optional at the Member State level was not the regime that the Commission 
wanted to implement, but it was the only way that a Takeover Bids Directive would be 
accepted in the political-economy climate. Legislating for opt-ins where a country choses not 
to apply the BNR and/or BTR was an attempt by the Commission to counteract this political 
economy problem and salvage as much of their initial objective as possible - namely 
facilitating takeover activity across the EU.68 Therefore, the current opt-in regime has its 
basis in a late-stage political compromise as opposed to sound economic or legal theory. 
The combination of legislative fatigue after years of negotiations and failed attempts, along 
with, in the words of European officials,  the need to "terminate this never-ending story"69 
and the feeling that "half a loaf was better than none"70, has resulted in a sub-optimal 
European takeover framework. It is submitted that the proposed regime therefore represents 
a positive advance for European takeover regulation.  
 
 
5.3 Reciprocity 
A further aspect of the BNR and BTR which needs to be addressed in the case for reform is 
the reciprocity exception introduced by Article 12 (3) of the Directive. Where a target 
company has chosen to opt-in to the reciprocity exception, it allows them to disapply the 
BNR and/or BTR if the bidder is themselves not subject to the same rules. The reciprocity 
exception is authorised by the companies' shareholders. Such authorisation must be made 
no earlier than 18 months before the bid is made public by the offeror company.71 
Like the 'opt-in' system, the reciprocity exception was borne out of political concerns rather 
than sound legal or economic theory72 and was motivated by resistance from interest groups 
who opposed pro-takeover regime changes.73 There were concerns that a BNR and BTR 
would put them on an unlevel footing as opposed to non-EU firms, in particular from the US, 
where they enjoy much greater access to takeover defences, giving the US firms a 
                                                            
68 See chapter 3 of this thesis, section entitled 'Aims of the Board Neutrality Rule' which concludes that the 
objective of the Directive was to facilitate takeover activity. See also P. Davies, nr21, above at p5. 
69 B. Clarke, ' Takeover Regulation: Through the Regulatory Looking Glass (July 24, 2007). CLPE Research Paper 
No. 18/2007 at p23. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002675 
70 L. Klaus‐Heiner COD/2002/0240, EP: legislative opinion, 1st reading or single reading  
(16/12/2003). 
71 Takeover Bids Directive, Article 12(5). 
72 See Chapter 3 of this thesis, section entitled 'Reciprocity'. 
73 Ibid 2 at p37.  
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perceived 'unfair advantage'.74 The High Level Group were of the opinion that no such 
advantage would exist, but the political necessity of addressing these concerns in order to 
achieve the Directive overrode the High Level Group.75 Indeed it is submitted that in the 
proposed reform of the BNR and BTR, the reciprocity exception should be removed entirely. 
There are two reasons for this.  
Firstly, it appears to have no readily identifiable economic benefits, but presents a number of 
drawbacks. The concept of reciprocity should provide a level playing field - in theory only 
companies which are contestable (because they are subject to the BNR and BTR) should be 
able to launch hostile bids for other companies. As Becht points out however, the reciprocity 
exception does not come close to achieving this.76 For example, a company controlled by a 
majority blockholder which is subject to both the BNR and BTR is not itself contestable, yet 
is not inhibited in any way by the reciprocity exception. In other words, being subject to the 
rules does not automatically make a company contestable. In addition, the reciprocity 
exception can create inefficiencies for both bidders and targets. It unduly restricts the 
number of potential offerors, by artificially reducing the pool of potential bidder companies to 
those which are themselves open to hostile bids.77 This not only decreases overall takeover 
activity but also reduces the scope for instances of competing bids, to which the empirical 
evidence attaches higher bid premia. Hence, reciprocity is likely to hurt the minority 
shareholders the Directive was intended to protect.78 On the other side of the same coin, 
reciprocity may hinder corporate restructuring. Suitable bidders which are not subject to the 
BNR or BTR (non-listed companies for example) may be prevented from acquiring targets 
which apply reciprocity, possibly leading to less suitable bidders acquiring them instead.79 
Secondly, under the proposed regime reciprocity becomes somewhat superfluous in nature - 
companies will have the option to opt-out of the default rules if they do not wish to be 
contestable, unlike under the current directive which does not allow for opt-out where the 
Member State has made the BNR or BTR mandatory.  
In summary, the reciprocity exception appears to be ill-grounded. At best it represents an 
unnecessary complication that provides no real benefits. At worst it actively distorts efficient 
                                                            
74 . High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels 10 January 
2002 at p42. 
75 Ibid.  
76 M. Becht, 'Reciprocity in Takeovers' (October 2003). ECGI ‐ Law Working Paper No. 14/2003. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003. 
77 B. Clarke “Articles 9 and 11 of the Takeover Directive (2004/25) and the Market for Corporate Control” 
[2006] Journal of Business Law at p373. 
78 Ibid 76 at p12  
79 Ibid 76 at p12‐13.  
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corporate restructuring and results in lower bid premiums for target shareholders. Based on 
this, it is argued that the exception should be removed from the Directive entirely. 
 
Reforming the Directive 
5.4 Article 9 - Board Neutrality 
The case has been presented above as to why a reform of the BNR would be desirable for 
the EU. The current implementation of the BNR did not achieve the goal of creating a level-
playing field, due to the optionality and reciprocity provisions. Moreover, it cannot be said 
that it has facilitated an active market for corporate control. In fact, the opposite may be true. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrated that it has been implemented in a protectionist manner 
by the Member States, causing some to move away from a previously mandatory BNR, 
while others qualified a mandatory BNR with the reciprocity exception.80  
Not a single observation has been recorded of a company opting-in to the BNR, suggesting 
that the opt-in mechanism is not adequate. Certain companies are unable to opt-in to a 
regime which would be efficient for them, while others face the opposite problem of being 
subject to a BNR and unable to opt-out. The culmination of this leads to the conclusion that 
the current BNR is sub-optimal and could be reformed to a more efficient regime.  
The economic and empirical evidence above counsels in favour of an open market for 
corporate control that restricts takeover defences.81 But certain instances have been 
identified where takeover defences are efficient for companies. There is more than one way 
of organising efficient production in a capitalist system. It is therefore submitted that 
facilitating an open market for corporate control in all instances is not desirable. In a minority 
of cases, companies should be able to deviate from this where it is efficient for them to do 
so. These instances will vary over time and between market sectors, leading to the 
conclusion that the decision of when to deviate from the default is best made at the 
individual company level.82  Moreover the corporate cultures are varied across Europe, with 
the 'varieties of capitalism' literature drawing a distinction between liberal and co-ordinated 
market economies.83 Though certain types of company tend to be the norm in particular 
States, there remains a minority which diverge from the norm. Regardless of whether the 
                                                            
80 See Table 1, above, showing which countries have become more or less bidder friendly. See also Chapter 3 
for a more comprehensive review of this.  
81 In addition to the above analysis, see Seretakis, above nr 8, for a summary of the economic benefits of a 
management restrictive regime.  
82 Ibid 2 at p3‐4.  
83 P Hall and D Soskice, ‘Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in P Hall and D Soskice (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (OUP, Oxford/New York 2001) 
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divergent companies are dispersedly held in typically blockholder countries or vice versa, the 
point is that company-level decision making respects these differences and does not result 
in the costs associated with a State-wide mandatory rule which only serves the majority at 
the detriment of the minority. Further, Member State decisions tend to be influenced by 
economic nationalism and should be removed from the equation.84 
All Member States should therefore apply a BNR as a default rule, with companies able to 
opt-out by amending their articles of association by a simple majority. The hurdle to opting 
out of the BNR should not be set too high. As discussed above, corporate law defaults tend 
to be sticky, so the frequency of company opt-outs is not expected to be high. Companies 
where it would be efficient to opt-out should not be deterred from doing so by setting a 
barrier which is excessive.  
The majority of companies will therefore be subject to the BNR, but where management is 
able to present convincing reasons to shareholders that defences would be in the best 
interests of the company, it is predicted that company level opt-outs will occur. As discussed 
above, a company's efficient exposure to takeovers will vary over time and at different 
stages of a firm's lifecycle. Closer to the IPO stage for example, a company's intrinsic value 
may depend heavily on future growth options and management may request defences to 
implement long-term plans. For instance, to make investments in R&D and/or specific 
human capital, which may see greater shareholder value over a longer investment horizon. 
Alternatively management may be better informed than the shareholders to reject a bid 
which does not accurately value the expected future growth.85  
However there is cause for concern that a company which opts-out for a genuine efficiency 
reason, will retain this arrangement after the original efficiency has expired. If shareholders 
approve a resolution allowing management to entrench themselves, such entrenchments are 
likely to remain in place after they have outlived their value.86 It was demonstrated above 
why a company will not opt in to a management restrictive regime and it will likely remain in 
place due to the shareholder's inability to initiate a change (due to rational apathy and 
collective action problems). It may be efficient for a company to opt-out of the BNR for a 
period of time, but as argued above, conditions will vary over the lifecycle of a firm and this 
period may only be temporary. In the instances that it is indeed temporary, a switch back to 
                                                            
84 Ibid 21.  
85 Ibid 2 at p11  
86L. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003) at p752. 
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the BNR would be desirable, but almost certainly would not occur because dispersed 
shareholders have been demonstrated to be unable to initiate a regime change.87 
In order to counteract this, it is submitted that when a company passes a resolution opting-
out of the BNR, this only has effect for a limited (albeit lengthy) period of time. Once the 
period of time elapses, the company automatically opts back in to the BNR. This will be 
further discussed below, but for now, this period can be given a maximum value of 4 years.88 
The expiration of this period removes the need for shareholders to bring an action by 
themselves, thereby sidestepping the collective action problems they face. In the case where 
it remains continually efficient to opt-out of the BNR, management  can propose another 
resolution at any point, which extends the period by a further 4 years from the date of the 
second resolution. For example a company which passes a resolution to opt-out in April 
2015, will not be subject to the BNR until April 2019. If the management proposes another 
resolution in April 2018 which is passed by the shareholders, the BNR will then not apply 
until April 2022. If the 2018 resolution does not pass, then the company will automatically opt 
back in to the BNR in 2019. This resetting mechanism is designed to ensure that defences 
are only possible while they serve shareholder value.  
A period of 4 years has been suggested. This period needs to be sufficiently  great enough 
to encourage management to credibly commit to a long-term strategy or make investments 
in human capital, which may not produce short-term gains but offers greater shareholder 
value long-term. 4 years should be either long enough to implement such strategy, or long 
enough to demonstrate to shareholders the value of the takeover defences. If these benefits 
can be shown to shareholders, then management should have no problem passing another 
resolution granting another 4 years 'extension'. If however they cannot, shareholders are 
unlikely to pass another resolution and the company will opt back in to the BNR after the 4 
year period, once again opening up the market for corporate control.  
Of course if this proposal were to be taken any further, a detailed study and consultation on 
assessing the length of a suitable time period would need to be carried out. Finding the 
equilibrium between furnishing management with enough time to execute a strategy, but 
short enough to prevent opportunistic managerial entrenchment would be the goal. 
                                                            
87 This mirrors the current implementation of the Directive where no examples of companies opting‐in to the 
BNR (or BTR) have been observed). 
88 The period of time should be great enough to allow Directors to implement long‐term strategy and make 
specific investments without having to be overly concerned with short‐term results. However 4 years is 
currently an arbitrarily chosen number. Careful consultations should be made as to what the appropriate time 
should be in the case of a reform. See also Davies et al, nr 21 above, for a similar suggestion. 
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In summary, a pro-management arrangement would need continual shareholder approval to 
remain in place, otherwise it automatically reverts back to the pro-shareholder default. 
 
5.5 Article 11 - The Breakthrough Rule 
As discussed in chapter 4, the BTR was envisaged by the Commission as a means of 
'breaking-through' defences which allow a controlling shareholder to maintain control despite 
not having proportional cash-flow rights.89 It effectively removes the decision making power 
from a controlling shareholder and transfers it to all the shareholders on a proportional 'one 
share one vote' basis. This opens up the market for corporate control in companies where 
there are disproportionate control rights assigned to a shareholder (for example with dual 
class shares / multiple voting rights) thereby facilitating takeovers and promoting active 
capital markets across the EU.  
However the vast majority of Member States chose not to implement the BTR. Only 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia implemented the BTR in response to the Directive and their 
capital markets make up only 0.071%,90 a tiny fraction, of the EU total. Moreover, not a 
single company in the other Member States has chosen to opt-in to the BTR. In short, there 
has been a total lack of transposition of the BTR which suggests it is inefficient in its current 
form.91 
This begs the question of whether the BTR can benefit from reform. There have been calls 
from some spheres for the BTR to be made mandatory across the EU. On the other hand, 
this thesis has so far advocated that flexible rules which allow companies to choose their 
own level of contestability represent the best regime possible for EU takeover regulation. 
Based on this  it will be shown why a mandatory BTR would not be a desirable reform. 
However it is also submitted that reforming the BTR in the same way as BNR, by making it a 
default rule which allows for company level opt-outs, would not be a feasible course of action 
either. Instead the BTR should at most play only a very limited role in EU takeover 
regulation. 
 
The Case Against a Mandatory Breakthrough Rule 
 
                                                            
89 J. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?, in Reforming 
Company And Takeover Law In Europe 677,(Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004) at p 683. 
90 See Chapter 4 of the thesis, above. Data taken from 2012 Financial Year. 
91 Ibid 49 at p195. 
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Chapter 4 identified a number of issues with the current formulation of the BTR under Article 
11. While these issues could theoretically be addressed so that the BTR could achieve its 
aim of opening the up the market for corporate control, it is submitted that even in this 
hypothetical scenario there is a lack of justifiable evidence that the BTR would produce 
positive results for the EU. Indeed the High Level Group which advocated the rule has been 
accused of dealing in summary fashion with the question of whether the BTR is "necessary, 
justifiable or even advisable."92 It seems the BTR would produce few certain benefits but 
cause significant certain costs.93 The point is, that while the current formulation of Article 11 
is deficient, the BTR itself does not appear to be well grounded and difficult to justify on an 
efficiency basis. Thus, even if the deficiencies were 'fixed', the BTR would not be a beneficial 
rule for EU takeover regulation. The following sections will briefly discuss the substantive 
deficiencies of the BTR under Article 11, before assessing why the BTR itself does not 
appear to be well grounded.  
 
 
Issues specific to the Article 11 BTR 
 
The issues specific to the current formulation of the BTR under Article 11 can be 
summarised as follows: 
 uneven application with regards to legal structures, allowing for evasion (i.e. applying 
to multiple voting shares, but not ceiling shares), 
 evasion through factual structures (Pyramidal groups, cross-shareholdings), 
 uncertainties over compensation. 
 
Firstly, the BTR appears to apply unevenly towards legal structures which separate 
ownership from control. While it seems the BTR will apply to multiple voting rights,94 other 
control enhancing mechanisms (CEMs) which have the same effect, such as ceiling shares 
or non-voting receipts, remain outside the scope of the BTR. Such an uneven application 
appears to affect certain Member States more than others depending on which CEMs are 
prevalent in a given Jurisdiction. The Nordic countries tend to make heavy use of multiple 
voting rights and consequently the BTR would have a much greater effect there, than in 
France for example, where ceilings shares are a more common CEM. Under the current 
Article 11 BTR, companies wishing to 'evade' the rule could do so by using a form of CEM 
                                                            
92 P. Mulbert, "Make it or Break it" in G. Ferrarini, K. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds), Reforming 
Company and Takeover Law in Europe (OUP 2004) at p718. 
93 Ibid 89 at p6.  
94 C. Clottens & Geens, K  “One Share – One Vote: Fairness, Efficiency and (the Case for) EU Harmonisation 
Revisited”  (2010) at p7. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547842. 
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which is outside its scope. It was concluded in Chapter 4 that there are no justifiable 
economic grounds for this discrepancy - instead it appears to be a result of political 
opportunism by certain Member States.95 From a legal standpoint it would be relatively 
straightforward to remedy this, by reforming the BTR to apply to the CEMs it currently does 
not. This would prevent certain companies from 'evading' the BTR in this manner. However 
from a political economy perspective this stands differently and reform would run into the 
same political problems that caused the uneven application in the first place. Nevertheless, 
for now the purpose is to show that even in a political vacuum, a hypothetical BTR with its 
deficiencies 'fixed' would still not have a clear positive impact on EU takeover regulation. 
  
Even if the above deficiency of the legal structures could be remedied, companies could still 
evade the BTR by using factual structures. Cross-shareholding and pyramid groups both 
produce the same effect of disproportionately separating capital and control. The BTR would 
need to be either 'reformulated in a radical way' to deal with pyramids,96 or simultaneous 
legislation introduced which prevents their use as a CEM. To be sure this would be a highly 
complex and difficult task and beyond the scope of this thesis, but theoretically it could be 
accomplished.  
 
The final issue is of compensation. Article 11 (5) provides for equitable compensation for 
holder's of rights which are broken through. Yet there is no method of quantification, 
delivery, or even which constituency bears the cost, provided for by the Directive. Not only 
does this provide a great deal of uncertainty and variation between Member States, but the 
timing of a tender offer is crucial97 and delays in the quantification process could prove fatal 
to a bid. Moreover, if the cost of compensation is to be borne by the bidder, this may well 
have a chilling effect on the number of bids, the opposite of the desired goal of facilitating 
takeovers.  
 
The above represent the three main criticisms that can be levelled at the substantive text of 
the BTR under Article 11. They constitute three significant deficiencies of the rule which 
would make it unsuccessful if it was to be made mandatory in its current form. 
Hypothetically, though difficult, each could be remedied. But it is argued that even if these 
deficiencies were corrected, the underlying rationale of the BTR is not well grounded and 
thus should not be implemented within the realm of takeover regulation.  
                                                            
95 T. Papadopoulos, "Legal Aspects of the Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid Directive". takeover 
regulation: a legal approach, Icfai Books, Icfai University Press (IUP), Icfai University, 2008 at p10. 
96 Ibid 94 at p26.  
97 J. Rickford 'Takeovers in Europe ‐ shareholders decisions and open markets ‐ a UK Perspective' in J. Grant 
(ed), European Takeovers: the Art of Acquisition (1st ed Euromoney Books) 2005 at p72. 
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The Breakthrough Rule does not appear well grounded 
 
As mentioned above, the BTR is directed primarily at companies where a shareholder 
exercises control disproportionately to their cash flow rights, through a dual class share 
structure. The structure is 'broken through' by selectively imposing a 'one share one vote' 
mandate pending a takeover bid or once a takeover bid is successful.98 
In order to demonstrate why the BTR does not appear well grounded on an efficiency basis, 
it first needs to be briefly discussed why such disproportionate controlling shareholders 
persist in public firms in the first place.99 The answer seems to be the 'private benefits of 
control' (PBC) that are enjoyed by the controller. As defined by Coates, they are: 
"any benefits that a control person derives from their control of a firm that are not shared 
proportionally with non-controlling shareholders"100 There has been much academic debate 
on the topic and composition of PBCs,101 but they can generally be categorised into three 
separate types: bad (inefficient) PBCs, good (efficient) PBCs and inherent PBCs. 
 
 The bad kind constitute a transfer of value from minority shareholders to the controller, 
where the loss suffered is greater than the gain. Examples of this include self-dealing, 
excessive risk aversion, operational strategies based on personal preference, excessive 
(often hidden) compensation102 and the transfer of profits or assets for personal gain, known 
as 'tunnelling.'103  
 
The good types of PBC are transfers where the gain by the controller is greater than the loss 
of the minority (they can also encompass situations where the controller gains and the 
minority shareholders suffer no loss, or a gain themselves). PBC could be considered to be 
efficiently extracted in the presence of larger synergy gains through participation in a 
corporate group in which the controller also holds a stake, as the controller benefits while 
also maximising firm value.104 Alternatively, the opportunity to pursue a venture may arise to 
                                                            
98 Ibid 2 at p38.  
99 Ibid 89 at p690.  
100 Ibid 89 at p690.  
101 See e.g. L. Bebchuk, "A Rent‐Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control", NEBR Working Paper 
7203 (1999) on the topic of 'bad PBCs'; H. Demsetz and K. Lehn,  The structure of corporate ownership: Causes 
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103S.  Johnson, R. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and A. Shleifer,  Tunnelling (January 2000). Harvard Institute of 
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a controller by virtue of his position, and pursuing it through the firm generates value for all 
shareholders.105 
 
'Inherent' (also known as non-pecuniary) PBCs are those that accrue to a controller by virtue 
of his position and are non-transferrable - they cannot be shared with minority 
shareholders.106 An often used example is that of ownership of a major newspaper or media 
company, which grants the owner social and political influence.  
 
Dual class share structures are used so that a controller can enjoy PBCs without needing to 
retain a majority of the cash flow rights. By using multiple vote shares, the controller can 
have the majority voting power and still raise more capital by selling off the majority of equity. 
Since they have the majority voting power, they can easily prevent a takeover from 
happening by simply not tendering their shares. The BTR would undo this structure by 
implementing a temporary 'one share one vote' mandate, allowing all the shareholders to 
proportionally decide on the merits of a bid. From a policy perspective, the question is 
whether it is better to implement the BTR and allow all  shareholders to decide on the bid 
proportionally, or to allow the controlling shareholder to decide on the bid.  
 
It is submitted that there is not sufficient economic justification for implementing a BTR. The 
benefits are unclear, but any such benefit would be outweighed by certain costs. This is 
because of the following reasons. Enriques et al have determined that a controller will reject 
value-decreasing takeover offers, and accept value-increasing ones (the two socially ideal 
outcomes) except in one scenario, which is where PBCs are extracted inefficiently by the 
controller.107 Here the takeover bid, which would represent a net gain for all the 
shareholders, undervalues the controllers PBCs and thus is rejected. 
 
The problem is that by imposing 'one share one vote' at the takeover stage, the BTR would 
eliminate the inefficiencies but also the benefits of dual class structures. The benefits being: 
net wealth gains where 'good' PBCs are extracted; the monitoring of management by the 
controller108 and the rejection of value-decreasing bids. Moreover, at the IPO stage when a 
company first goes public, it is not problematic for the owners to choose a dual class 
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structure because they themselves will bear the cost.109 The markets apply a discount to 
lower voting shares, and with this knowledge owners who go public with a dual class 
structure knowingly accept the lower capital. Thus, it can be said these deviations from 'one 
share one vote' are efficient because it is the owner (who becomes the controller) who bears 
the cost.  
 
Thus there are benefits of dual class structures which would be lost if a BTR was 
implemented. On the other hand, a BTR would remove the inefficiencies caused by bad 
PBCs in dual class companies. If there was compelling evidence that such bad PBCs were a 
widespread and significant problem in the EU then it could be argued that implementing the 
BTR to eliminate the inefficiencies would outweigh losing the benefits. However the empirical 
evidence does not show this. In countries with high quality corporate law and effective 
courts, bad PBCs are usually not substantial.110 Generally, this is the case for EU Member 
States and the empirical studies carried out support this, showing that companies with dual 
class stock do not underperform compared to those which apply 'one share one vote' - 
suggesting PBCs are not extracted to inefficient levels.111 
 
A further cost of implementing the BTR is that it would cause controllers who wish to retain 
their control to attempt to evade it. Pyramids currently constitute an 'easy escape'112 and 
have multiple costs at a welfare level. Firstly, reorganising to a pyramidal group would bring 
transaction costs as well as lawyers and bankers fees, which can be significant.  Secondly 
they are more opaque than dual class structures and therefore harder for investors to price. 
Finally, it would distract senior management from their day to day duties which would have a 
negative impact on regular business operation.113 Moreover any reform of pyramidal groups 
would be, by the Commission's own acknowledgement, expensive and complicated.114 
 
Even if the 'problem' of pyramids as CEMs could be solved as discussed above, the 
introduction of a BTR may simply discourage firms from ever going public in the first place, in 
                                                            
109 G. Ferrarini, 'One Share ‐ one vote: A European Rule?' (2006) EGCI Working Paper Series n58/2006 at p11. 
110 Ibid 2 at p17.  
111 For studies on the incidence of PBC, see J. Coates nr 89 above, at p17; C. Rose, 'Corporate finance 
Performance and the use of takeover defences', 13 European J L&Econ. 91 (2002); for US firms, see L. Field and 
Karpoff,' Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms (2002). Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 5, October 2002. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=286923 but c.f. Ehrhardt, Olaf and Nowak, Eric, Private Benefits and Minority 
Shareholder Expropriation (or What Exactly are Private Benefits of Control?) (June 2003). EFA 2003 Annual 
Conference Paper No. 809. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=423506 who find that German firms 
with DC structures underperform. 
112 Ibid 94 at p23.  
113 Ibid 2 at p12  
114 E. Berglöf and M. Burkart, ‘European Takeover Regulation’ (2003) 36 Economic Policy 173. 
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order for the founders to retain control. Founders may well avoid capital markets if it means 
they cannot preserve their control. Instead they would seek costlier sources of financing, 
hampering growth and development and resulting in a net loss to social welfare. In addition, 
the need to pay compensation to a controller for broken-through rights would add further 
cost to a bid, and is likely to have a chilling effect instead of facilitating takeovers.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the benefits of a BTR are questionable, but the costs are 
certain. Based on this it can be concluded that a mandatory BTR would not be a positive 
step for EU takeover regulation. 
 
 
A default BTR? 
 
It has been argued that a mandatory BTR as with a mandatory BNR, is not the ideal 
approach for EU takeover regulation. But while the BNR can benefit from being made a 
default rule at the European level from which companies can opt-out, the same is not true for 
the BTR.  
 
It was stated above that the situation in which a BTR is beneficial involves a shareholder, 
who exercises control disproportionately, inefficiently extracting PBCs from the rest of the 
shareholders while being immune from a hostile bid. A default rule would of course offer no 
value here, because such a controller would simply be able to opt-out. Indeed, it would be 
irrational to allow a controller to decide on the limitation of their voting rights in case of 
takeover.115 While additional hurdles to opting-out such as majority of the minority voting 
may alleviate this problem, the risk it would add of being unable to opt-out would be 
regarded by a controller in the same way as a mandatory BTR. As a consequence the same 
problems would be encountered - controllers choosing to evade the BTR via a pyramid 
group, or avoiding capital markets altogether. In summary, it therefore seems at neither a 
mandatory or a default BTR would bring benefits that would outweigh the inevitable 
associated costs.  
 
There may however be some useful scope for a Menu-rule BTR which acts as a sunset 
clause as first suggested by Professor Coates116 and developed by Enriques et al who state:   
 
                                                            
115 Ibid 49 at p312.  
116 Ibid 89 at pp707‐709.  
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"In a setting where the founder believes that the market will undervalue the 
company's stock because of its dependence on future growth options, a 
BTR becoming effective at a specified date (e.g., ten years after the IPO) 
would both credibly inform the market of the reason for the departure from 
1S1V [One share on vote] and provide a time frame in which growth options 
will have to materialize, in effect buying the founder only time. While we 
have shown earlier that a leveraged control structure always gives the 
controlling shareholder an option to give it up if the price of the leverage as 
reflected in the market discount gets too high, opting into a sunset-style BTR 
may allow the controlling shareholder to avoid some or all of the discount 
that would reflect the anticipation of private benefit extraction." 
 
The fact that the BTR is already a menu rule which no companies have chosen to opt in to 
may lead to one question if this reformulation will fare any better. Unlike the current BTR 
however which relies irrationally on a controller to place restrictions on their own control,  
this 'sunset BTR' does provide a benefit to the controller and is therefore significantly more 
likely to see the light of day on a corporate charter. 
 
Summary 
 
The BTR was an innovative and forward-thinking concept in the realm of takeover regulation, 
but such a radical idea needs clear theoretical and empirical justification before being 
implemented. Ultimately the BTR does not stand up to this requirement. A reform of the 
Directive should therefore remove Article 11 as it currently stands. In its current form it is 
virtually unused and reforming it into a mandatory or default rule would not provide clear 
benefits, but would incur associated costs. Instead it may find better use as a 'sunset' style 
menu rule which companies can opt-in to, as put forward by Enriques et al. While such a rule 
may only see limited use, it would incur no social welfare costs as it is the company owner 
who chooses to place a limit on his own voting power.  
 
In situations where a controller inefficiently extracts PBCs, the BTR would enable a bidder to 
circumvent the controller and effectively make a bid to dispersed shareholders by imposing 
'one share one vote'. However it is submitted that the BTR only provides a second-best, ex 
post solution to the problem of inefficient PBCs while also incurring costs. Instead, high 
quality corporate law and effective courts which prevent controllers from extracting PBCs 
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inefficiently would be a more desirable solution.117 But such a discussion is beyond the 
scope of this work. For now it can be concluded that neither a default nor mandatory BTR is 
optimal for EU takeover regulation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
117 Gilson, Ronald J. and Schwartz, Alan, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control 
Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review (August 14, 2012). Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
455. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis began by tracing the arduous and long winded path to adoption that the Directive 
took, highlighting the difficulties that legislators must overcome in this area. Public 
companies often represent a significant proportion of a nation's economy, understandably 
leading to national protectionist influence which can create barriers to legal reform. 
Moreover, incumbent interest groups in this area are competent, financially well-equipped 
and possess a sufficient interest to block legal innovations. Ultimately the Takeover Directive 
was fraught with political compromise resulting in the  Articles regulating takeover defences 
being rendered optional and the concept of reciprocity introduced. Accordingly the 
formulations of the BNR and BTR do not have their foundations in sound economic or legal 
theory and as such, this thesis has attempted to show that they do not constitute the optimal 
regime for European takeover regulation.  
 
Instead, the situation has been assessed through an efficiency lens. The efficient level of 
exposure to takeovers will vary from company to company, across industry sectors and 
Member States. Further, any given company's efficient exposure is not a constant. It will 
change over time at different stages in the company's lifecycle and may depend on current 
market conditions. Takeover rules which suit a company at the IPO stage in an 'economic 
boom' may not be efficient for the same company a decade later in a financial crisis after it 
has matured. In sum, the constituency best placed to decide what level of takeover exposure 
a company has, is the company itself. 
 
Instead, the Directive placed this decision at the Member State level. The result was that the 
majority of Member States retained the status quo, and some even departed further from a 
takeover friendly regime. Opt-ins were placed at the company level as well, yet with the 
benefit of hindsight, one can say that these opt-ins are in reality unworkable - illustrated by a 
complete lack of observable opt-ins across the entirety of the EU. 
 
In light of this, the thesis has suggested a number of reforms. Based on value justifications, it 
is submitted that both the BTR and the reciprocity exception should be removed. With the 
BTR, there is a lack of clear evidence that such a rule, either mandatory or default, would 
provide economic benefits that are outweighed by the costs. Reciprocity similarly seems to 
lack a sound economic justification and can best be seen as a result of political compromise 
caused by legislative fatigue and the sentiment of the Rapportuer that 'half a loaf is better 
than none'. 
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It has hopefully been demonstrated that the BNR can benefit from being implemented 
instead as a default rule across the EU. Removing the Member States from the decision-
making equation and placing it solely at the company level allows for an opt-out system 
which, unlike the current system, will see observable action at the company level. This is 
achieved by reversing the default regime, and placing the burden to alter the default on the 
management of the company as opposed to dispersed shareholders, who are poorly 
equipped to initiate change. It has been argued that this represents the optimal regime as 
deviations from the default will only take place where it is efficient to do so. Further, such 
deviations have in effect a time-limit within which they can be renewed, or expire. 
There will never be a perfect takeover regime which allows for only value-enhancing 
takeovers to go through while preventing value-decreasing ones. But this should not deter 
regulators from striving for the best regime possible. It has been said that 'the perfect is the 
enemy of the good' and in this regard, the takeover Directive represents an important step 
on the path to an optimal European regime. With the benefit of hindsight, and the knowledge 
gained through how the Directive has been applied, this thesis has attempted to argue in 
which direction future steps should continue to be taken.  
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